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COMMENTS
AGE VERIFICATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: SWIPING AWAY
YOUR PRIVACY
I.

INTRODUCTION

After a long hard workweek, on Friday evening you decide to meet
up with a few friends at a neighborhood bar near your home. On your
way to the bar, you stop by a convenience store to purchase a pack of
cigarettes. You walk in the door and tell the man working behind the
counter what you want. He grabs the cigarettes and asks you for identification to assure you are over the age of eighteen. He then takes your
driver's license and swipes it through a scanning device. This device
reads the information encoded in the barcode on the back of your
driver's license to determine if the license is valid and verifies your age.
The light on the device turns green, and he proceeds to sell you the
cigarettes.
You continue down the street to the neighborhood bar, your original
destination. Once there you are greeted by the doorman, who asks you
for your identification to assure you are of legal age. You again hand
over your driver's license, and he swipes it through a scanning device.
The device once again reads the barcode on the back of your license, the
light turns green, and he hands the license back to you and allows you
to enter. You enter the bar, without thinking anything has just happened to you besides your age being checked to assure that you are old
enough to purchase cigarettes or consume alcohol, and enjoy the evening with some friends.
This whole scenario may sound like an excerpt out of a futuristic
science fiction novel, but the practice of driver's license swiping is occurring at many types of private businesses where proof of age or security
issues arise. 1 This practice of "swiping" has beneficial uses for both pri1. Rina C.Y. Chung, Hong Kong's "Smart" Identity Card: Data Privacy Issues and
Implications for a Post-September 11th America, 4 U. of Haw. Asian-P. L. & Policy J. 442,
443 (2003); Jennifer Lee, Welcome to the DatabaseLounge, N.Y. Times G3 (Mar. 21, 2002);
Kim Zetter, Great Taste, Less Privacy, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.
html (last updated Feb. 6, 2004); Deborah Pierce, Swiping driver's licenses - instant marketing lists?, http://www.seattlepress.com/print-10148.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2003).
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vate entities, in identifying underage persons and those with fake identification, 2 and law enforcement. 3 However, the problem is that in the
private sector, businesses are not using the information to merely identify underage customers or those with fake identification; many are stor4
ing the information encoded on the barcode in a computer database.
Currently, no federal laws and very few state laws regulate the collection
and use of this information. 5 Basic guidelines exist to make people
aware that their information is being collected electronically and to alert
them to how it is being used. 6 Yet, the private sector is not following
7
these guidelines.
The information is stored on drivers' licenses electronically via either a magnetic strip or a barcode, and is obtained by swiping a license
through a scanning device. 8 The data encoded ranges from basic name,
address, and expiration date information to much more intrusive information such as social security number, electronic fingerprint, and electronic image of the holder's signature. 9 Some states encrypt data that is
more sensitive, like electronic fingerprints or photographs, so only law
enforcement officials can decode it, but others do not. 10 There are also
guidelines set forth for the collection of electronic data, the Fair Information Practice Principles, which are supposed to protect people by informing them that their data is being collected and how it is used. 1
However, without some type of enforcement, these guidelines are just
guidelines. 12 Currently, there is no type of redress against private entities for people whose information is not collected according to the
2. Nicole Christiansen, Machines detect fake IDs, LXXXVII The Aquin 3 (Sept. 27,
2002) (available at http://www.stthomas.edu/aquin/092702/00092702.pdf).
3. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1 at [1 10], http://www.wired.comlnews/print0,
1294,62182,00.html.
4. Chung, supra n. 1, at 443.
5. Id.
6. Fed. Trade Commn., Privacy Online: A Report to Congress, at III (June 1998) (accessible online at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/toc.htm.) [hereinafter FTC Report].
7. See generally Swipe, Research, http://www.we-swipe.us/research.html (last accessed Nov. 18, 2004) (stating that usually businesses do not ask for consent before swiping
a person's license, or even notify the person that the swiping has taken place).
8. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [IT 1-5], http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,62182,00.html.
9. Chung, supra n. 1, at 443; Research, supra n. 7 at What Information is Encoded on
Drivers' Licenses?.
10. Cal. Assembly Comm. on Jud., A.B. 224 Privacy: Electronic Reading and Use of
Identification Card Data, 2003-2004, at 3 (Mar. 4, 2003); Infra nn. 265-266 (discussing that
most states encode biometric data so that only law enforcement can access it, and discussing the precautions Illinois takes to protect encoded data) [hereinafter Electronic Reading].
11. FTC Report, supra n. 6; infra pt. II(D) (giving a brief history of and setting forth a
brief description of the fair information practice principles).
12. Id. at 111(5).
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principles. 13
Law enforcement officers, 14 as well as private businesses, have the
ability to use the information in several ways. 15 First law enforcement
officers are able to make their work more efficient and safe. 16 They can
scan the license to instantly complete data fields of electronic citations,
and to run up to the minute background checks on people they have
stopped. 17 Furthermore, police may call private establishments that
scan and retain data to determine if a certain person has visited the business recently,18 or to obtain personal records from the enterprise about
an individual. 19
Private entities may use the scanning and information retention for
their own benefits as well. 20 The most obvious benefit is the reduction in
underage drinking and smoking because the entities can easily tell the
age of the patron, and identify fraudulent identification. 2 1 Through the
stored data, an establishment can also learn a great deal about its customer base, and then directly market entertainment events and promotions to specified individuals it believes would be most interested in the
event. 22 A business may also program a scanner to reject a certain individual because that person has caused problems at the enterprise in the
24
past. 2 3 This information helps protect the safety of patrons.
The problem arises not with business enterprises scanning the licenses, but with the storage of the data obtained through the swipe. The
private sector intends to use scanning and data storage only for age ver13. Research, supra n. 7, at Commercial Data Warehouses.
14. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1121, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
15. See Christiansen, supra n. 2.
16. See generally Zebra Technologies, Electronic Citation Systems: The Safe Choice to
Save Time and Improve Accuracy (Jan. 2004) (available at http:/www.zebra.com/
whitepapers/WP13503Lcitation Sys.pdf) (noting how law enforcement officers can make
their jobs safer by swiping because they can get immediate information and keep their
attention focused on the suspect) [hereinafter Electronic Citation Systems]; Bob Howie,
Oak Ridge to update court software; Old system slows processing of information, The Houston Chronicle Sec. This Week Pg. 3, [9 6-9] (June 24, 2004); Great Taste, Less Privacy,
supra n. 1, at [9 12], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
17. Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16.
18. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [9 15], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
19. See generally Lee, supra n. 1, at [1 15].
20. Chung, supra n. 1, at 443; Lee, supra n. 1; Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1,
http://www.wired.com/news/print/O,1294,62182,00.html; Christiansen, supra n. 2.
21. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443.
22. Lee, supra n. 1 at [ T 22-27].
23. Id. at [1 311.
24. See Id. at [ 31] (noting how easily a bar or restaurant can program a scanning
device to reject a troublesome person's admittance, and implicitly stating how all patron's
safety increases by preventing troublesome patrons into the establishment).
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ification and marketing purposes, 2 5 but the possibility of the information
falling into the wrong person's possession abounds. 26 If an individual at
the business collecting the data personally possessed the records, the
possibility of crimes such as stalking and identity theft are possible, not
to mention more severe crimes like rape or murder. 27 Such sensitive
data should be protected from falling into the wrong person's possession
through some type of regulation or legislation.
Several states have acted on the subject and have developed laws
prohibiting the use of swiping. 28 Some states also regulate the amount
of information that can be obtained and the purposes for which it may be
30
stored. 2 9 However, in most states, the practice is entirely unregulated.
Most people either have no idea that the transfer and storage of data
occurs, or do not know the amount of information being conveyed and
31
saved.
This comment seeks to argue that United States citizens have a
right to privacy with regard to the information contained on their identification cards. 32 First, the background of the comment will describe how
swiping technology works and what types of regulations currently exist
to govern swiping. This section will also introduce the Fair Information
Practice Principles, and give a brief history of their application. The
25. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 ("Furthermore, the bar's management may decide to collect this information and use it to build up its own customer database for marketing
purposes").
26. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 23], http://www.wired.comlnews/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html (A bar employee could use the database to make a list for stalking
purposes of" all blond female patrons between the ages of 21 to 25 who weigh 120 pounds."
The scanners bars and restaurants use are handheld so "an employee could pull out a personal scanner and scan cards twice to sell the data for ID theft crimes").
27. Id. at [
23-24], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
28. Research, supra n. 7, at Is Swiping Happening in my State?.
29. Id.
30. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443; Infra II(C)(i)-(v) (discussing which states have regulations limiting the use of swiping and subsequent data retention by private businesses).
31. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supran. 1, at [ 1-6], http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,62182,00.html.
32. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances."); U.S. Const. amend. IV; ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. . ."); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that even
though the Constitution does not explicitly state a right to privacy, the Supreme Court of
the United States has often recognized a right to personal privacy); See Don Goldhamer,
Privacy Concerns, Swiss House for Advanced Research and Education Presentation, Boston
Mass. (July 24, 2000) (available at http://home. uchicago.edu/-dhgo/privacy-intro/index.
html) (describing American's general rights to privacy and how the Constitution and Supreme Court interpret them).
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comment then discusses all the current applications of swiping, including law enforcement and private enterprise use. The potential costs and
benefits of scanning and data retention are analyzed to determine
whether the practice should continue to be unregulated in private enterprises. The comment will argue that a person should have the right to
purchase something that is legal without having to exchange his or her
sensitive information for this item. People should also be aware that
their information is being collected and receive notice as to how it could
be used.3 3 Lastly, this comment suggests that legislation be put in place
to regulate the practice of scanning and storing patron's personal information. As the practice of swiping becomes widespread among private
enterprises that must check for proof of age, 3 4 inevitably, this information may fall into the wrong person's hands and this must be prevented
from happening.
II. BACKGROUND
The practice of swiping identification to verify age is rather new.
Only with the advent of a majority of states having encoded data on their
drivers' licenses via a magnetic strip or two-dimensional barcode was the
practice feasible. Currently over forty states store encoded data on their
licenses, and most of the rest of the states are planning to do so in the
near future. 35 The widespread use of licenses containing encoded data,
coupled with the proliferation of private businesses purchasing and using scanning equipment to swipe the cards, has placed the issue on
center stage. 36 Demonstratively, there is federal law prohibiting departments of motor vehicles from releasing an individual's information to a
private entity.3 7 However, there is no federal law, and very few state
33. See FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III (noting that people often have their personal
information collected without their knowledge and that some type of legislation should be
enacted to alert people this practice is taking place).
34. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 ("In the United States a growing number of private businesses are utilizing this driver's license scanning technology. Bars and convenience stores
increasingly rely on this technology to avoid illegal sales of alcohol and cigarettes to underage purchasers").
35. Lee, supra n. 1, at [1 7] ("Already, about 40 states issue driver's licenses with bar
codes or magnetic stripes that carry standardized data, and most of the others plan to issue
them within the next few years"); infra n. 78 (discussing that the only states which currently do not use some type of electric data encryption on their licenses are Alaska, New
Jersey, and Wyoming).
36. See generally Lee, supra n. 1 (addressing the fact that many private businesses are
either swiping currently, or will be in the near future); Research, supra n. 7 (noting numerous issues that have arisen solely from swiping.
37. Lee, supra n. 1 at [$1 16-19] (Congress passed the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
in 1994 "to limit the amount of information that can be released by departments of motor
vehicles").
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laws preventing a private entity from collecting the information directly
38
from the individual.

A.

LICENSE DATA

In the past, drivers licenses in all states only contained a limited
amount of data displayed on the front of the license. 39 The information
was basic and included items such as name, address, date of birth, and
possibly social security number. 40 In order to retrieve any information
off the license, the reader simply read the data from the license. 4 1 Over
the last decade or so drivers' licenses that are machine-readable have
come into existence. 42 The new license contains a magnetic strip or two
dimensional barcode with data encoded on it. 4 3 Now instead of having to
manually read or write down the information in order to store it, the
license is swiped through a digital scanner and the data encoded on the
44
strip is transferred to a computer.
Originally, the new licenses had the same data encoded on them as
what was printed on the front. 4 5 Swiping the license could attain the
data faster, but the person scanning it could not access any more data
than what the license contained in print format. With the advent of better technology though, the data encoded on the license is now in greater
detail, and much more private than what is printed on the front. 4 6 A
number of licenses now include information in addition to the basic information. 47 For example, Kentucky embeds a digital picture of the holder
on the barcode of its licenses. 48 Washington D.C., Georgia, and Hawaii
all include digital fingerprints on their barcodes, and Tennessee includes
38. Id. at [1 19] (". . . there are only spotty controls over how businesses can create such
databases on their own."); Research, supra n. 7, at Is Swiping Happening in my State? ("It
is also a state choice to regulate driver's license swiping or-in more instances-not
regulate.").
39. Lee, supra n. 1 at [
14-16].
40. Id.
41. See Id. (describing alternate ways of retrieving information off of drivers' licenses
other than swiping).
42. Id. at [
6-8].
43. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 4], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
44. See Id. at [1 17] (describing how easily data collection has become through
swiping).
45. Lee, supra n. 1 at [
14-16].
46. Research, supra n. 7, at What Information is Encoded on Drivers' Licenses?.
47. Id.; Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 11], http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
48. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [ 11], http'//www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html; Research, supra n. 7, at What Information is Encoded on Drivers'
Licenses?.
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a facial recognition template. 49 Information encrypted in other states
includes digital signature, social security number, and medical
50
indicators.
The information is actually stored on the back of the driver's license
in either a magnetic strip or a two dimensional barcode. 5 1 The magnetic
strip licenses have a solid dark stripe across the top of the back of the
license. 52 A machine places magnetic fields of data on the strip that usually includes the data printed on the front of the license. 53 A magnetic
strip scanner is needed in order to retrieve the encoded data from the
license, and software is needed in order to translate the data into readable information. 54 Magnetic strips cannot hold near as much information as a two dimensional barcode, and have no security or encryption
capabilities. 55 Therefore, no biometric information such as digital
56
photos, fingerprints, or signatures can be stored on magnetic strips.
The two dimensional barcode is a more advanced tool for encoding
data on the back of licenses, and currently more than thirty states use
it. 5 7 The two dimensional barcode is a series of ink printed bars on the
back of a driver's license. 58 It looks different from a traditional barcode
used on grocery packaging because it has the second dimension that enables storage of greater amounts of data.5 9 It may be two square inches
or larger, and traditionally replaces the magnetic strip. 60 Since the twodimensional bar code can store much more data than a magnetic strip, it
is capable of storing compressed data in various forms including photos,
61
digital fingerprints, or digital signatures.
The information from a two dimensional barcode is retrieved in a
very similar fashion as the magnetic stripe. 62 A scanner is required to
read the barcode, and software is required to translate the data into a
49. Research, supra n. 7, at What Information is Encoded on Drivers' Licenses?.
50. Id.
51. Id. at How do ID Card Technologies Work?; Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at
[1 4], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
52. Positive Access Corporation, Frequently Asked Question (FAQ), http://www.positiveaccess.com/faqs.html (last updated Aug. 27, 2004).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Research, supra n. 7, at How do ID Card Technologies Work?.
56. See Id. (stating that magnetic strips cannot hold as much information as two dimensional barcodes, and that unlike the magnetic strip data can be encrypted on the two
dimensional barcode).
57. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52; Infra n. 79 (discussing that thirty-nine
states currently use two-dimensional barcodes to encrypt data on their drivers' licenses).
58. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

370

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

readable form. 63 Unlike on a magnetic strip, the compressed data encoded on two-dimensional bar codes is supposed to be encrypted by the
state to limit its access to law enforcement agencies only. 6 4 The technology is available to encode and include all types of information on new
driver's licenses, but the legislation to regulate what can be done with
that data has lagged far behind.
B.
1.

FEDERAL LAws

Drivers Privacy ProtectionAct ("DPPA")

The DPPA is a federal law passed in 1994 in response to various
crimes committed by people who obtained information about their victims from the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"). 65 The most prominent example was the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, who
was killed by an obsessed fan that obtained her address from the California motor vehicle record. 6 6 Another crime took place in Iowa during the
same time and in a similar manner. 67 A band of thieves obtained their
victims' addresses by writing down the license plate number of expensive
cars and then obtaining the home address information from the department of motor vehicles. 68 Consequently, Congress enacted the DPPA to
stop such abuses of the department of motor vehicles. 69 Before the
DPPA was enacted, obtaining a person's private information for the pur70
pose of committing crimes was far too easy.
The DPPA prohibits a state department of motor vehicles from disseminating the information contained on a persons motor vehicle re72
cord. 7 1 The statute prevents the release of both "personal information"
63. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52.
64. Id.
65. Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Drivers Privacy ProtectionAct (DPPA)
and the Privacy of Your State Motor Vehicle Record, http://www.epic.org/privacy/dppa/default.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter DPPA and Privacy].
66. Id. (Rebecca Schaefer was an actress and California resident. In 1989, an obsessed
fan hired a private investigator to obtain Ms. Schaefer's address. The investigator did so
through the California motor vehicle record. The fan subsequently stalked and killed Ms.
Schaefer. When passed, the DPPA contained many exceptions, or reasons that a driver's
motor vehicle record may be legally used. Included in that list of exceptions is the use by a
licensed investigator or security service (18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(7) (2000)), the very means Ms.
Schaefer's murderer used to retrieve the address).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. DPPA and Privacy, supra n. 65 ("...in '34 States, someone [could] walk into a State
Motor Vehicle Department with your license plate number and a few dollars and walk out
with your name and home address.'").
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (2000) ("A State department of motor vehicles, and any officer,
employee, or contractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available
to any person or entity: (1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(3), about
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and "highly restricted personal information." 73 Before the DPPA was enacted, the state DMVs were not only giving out the information to individuals, but many were selling the license holder's personal information
74
to marketing companies, charities, and various political campaigns.
The DPPA however has numerous exceptions, or permissible uses. 75
Many private businesses utilizing swiping believe that their actions are
protected by the DPPA exception of a legitimate business use. 76 The private sector may be correct that the DPPA does allow it to use a person's
license to verify proof of age where necessary, however, the DPPA does
not allow the storage of the individual's personal data in a private
77
database.
any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section; or (2) highly restricted personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(4), about any individual obtained by the department in
connection with a motor vehicle record, without the express written consent of the person
to whom such information applies, except uses permitted in subsections. .. ").
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (2000) ("'personal information' means information that identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and
medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents,
driving violations, and driver's status"); Sen. 116, 109th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2005) (stating that
the proposed legislation would expand the definition of personal information that could not
be released by state DMVs).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2725(4) ("'highly restricted personal information' means an individual's
photograph or image, social security number, medical or disability information"); Sen. 116,
supra n. 72 (stating that the legislation would expand highly restricted personal information to include an individual's photograph or any physical copy of the driver's license). Id.
The proposed legislation would also prohibit the disclosure of the personal information of
an individual by a private business to a non-affiliated third party unless certain procedures
for notice to the individual and an opportunity to restrict the disclosure were followed. Id.
Finally, the legislation would forbid a private business from requiring an individual from
disclosing his or her social security number in order to obtain goods or services. Id.
74. Lee, supra n. 1 at [1 18] ("Before the law was adopted, states were selling driver's
license information to direct marketing companies, charities and political campaigns.").
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (stating fourteen reasons or exceptions why the information
described in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) that is not allowed to be disclosed by the DMV may be
disclosed). Id. The exceptions allowing the use of the information range from the legitimate use of a business in the normal course of business (3), to the use by any private
investigator or security personnel (8), to the bulk distribution of surveys or other marketing materials by the State (12).
76. Id. at (b)(3)(A). ("For use in the normal course of business by a legitimate business
or its agents, employees, or contractors, but only - (A) to verify the accuracy of personal
information submitted by the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or
contractors").
77. Research, supra n. 7, at Is this Legal? ("Businesses who swipe will most likely say
they are protected by this last clause: that swiping is a legitimate business need to verify
age and validate a driver's license. But is creating a database from the swiped information
for future use and profit a necessity to verify the accuracy of personal information? We'd
say no").
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STATE LAWS

Currently forty-seven states use some type of data encryption
method on their driver's license, 78 and thirty-nine of those states use the
two dimensional barcode. 79 The DPPA is the only federal regulation on
the use of an individual's department of motor vehicles personal information and record.8 0 However, a few states have enacted legislation on
81
their own to combat or limit the practice of swiping.
1.

Texas Law

The Texas statute that went into effect on September 1, 2001,82
takes a hard-line approach to the issue of private enterprises swiping
drivers' licenses to verify age and subsequently retaining the electronically encrypted data. The law, part of the Alcoholic Beverage Code,
states that an individual or business may access the electronically encoded information on a driver's license to verify proof of age information
in accordance with the code. 8 3 It further states that the individual or
business may not retain the information retrieved from the scan in a
database.8 4 The information can only be saved if the alcohol commission
requires the entity to retain the information.8 5 The business may then
78. Positive Access Corporation, Where it Works, http://www.positiveaccess.com/
where it works.html (last updated Aug. 27, 2004) (Currently Alaska, New Jersey, and Wyoming are the only three states that use no type of electronic data encryption process on
individual's drivers licenses).
79. Id. (In addition to Alaska, New Jersey and Wyoming, which do not use any type of
electronic data encryption process on their individual's drivers' licenses; currently California, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Texas, and Vermont use a type of electronic data encryption on their drivers' licenses other than the two-dimensional barcode.).
80. See Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 23] (mentioning only the DPPA
when talking about federal protections of drivers' license data), http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html; Lee, supra n. 1 at [T 17] (mentioning only the DPPA
when talking about federal protections of drivers' license data).
81. Research, supra n. 7, at Is Swiping Happening in my State?; Lee, supra n. 1 at [I
19]; Ill. H. 487, 94th Gen. Assembly (Feb. 10, 2005) (stating that a proposed bill in the most
recent Illinois state legislative session would prohibit information from a driver's license
from being used for any purpose other than to verify proof of age, including but not limited
to selling the information or using the information for any type of solicitations, with the
exception that the individual gave express permission so that the information could be used
for such purposes).
82. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Code § 109.61 (2004).
83. Id. at § 109.61(a) ("A person may access electronically readable information on a
driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identification certificate for the purpose of
complying with this code or a rule of the commission, including for the purpose of preventing the person from committing an offense under this code.").
84. Id. at § 109.61(b) ("A person may not retain information accessed under this
section. .. ).
85. Id. at § 109.61(b) ("...unless
the commission by rule requires the information to be
retained.")
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only retain the data for as long as the commission requires.8 6 In addition, the retained information may not be marketed in any way.8 7 Violation of the statute is a Class A misdemeanor.8 8 In Texas, a Class A
misdemeanor is punishable by a fine up to four thousand dollars, a jail
term of not more than one year, or both the fine and jail term.8 9 There
has been no challenge to the Texas state law limiting the retention of
scanned driver's license data. The Texas Code requires proof of age in
order to purchase tobacco products,90 but it does not address the issue of
swiping drivers' licenses to verify the proof of age.
2.

New Hampshire Law

The New Hampshire law, which was added as an amendment to an
existing statute regulating the use of drivers' licenses in 2002, 9 1 takes an
even stricter approach to the issue of scanning and data retention for
proof of age purposes. The New Hampshire statute prohibits not only
the storing of electronic data encoded on an individual's identification,
but it prohibits the swiping of the card to verify age entirely. 9 2 In addition, the statute acknowledges that swiping may be a better way to verify
that the customer's identification is valid and that the holder is of age
than merely looking at the card. 93 However, it also states that a seller of
alcohol or tobacco who uses due diligence in checking for proof of age, but
not swiping the license, will not be held responsible for the acceptance of
fraudulent identification. 9 4 The statute does allow a person to transfer
information, in non-electronic form, to another person from the driver's
86. Id. at § 109.61(a) ("The person may not retain the information longer than the commission requires").
87. Tex. Alcoholic Bev. Code § 109.61(c) ("Information accessed under this section may
not be marketed in any manner").
88. Id. at § 109.61(d) ("A person who violates this section commits an offense. An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor").
89. Tex. Penal Code § 12.21 (2004) ( "An individual adjudged guilty of a Class A misdemeanor shall be punished by: (1) a fine not to exceed $ 4,000; (2) confinement in jail for a
term not to exceed one year; or (3) both such fine and confinement").
90. Tex. Health and Safety Code § 161.082(e) (2004).
91. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263:12 (2003).
92. Id. at § 263:12(X) ("It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to: (X) Knowingly
scan, record, retain, or store in any electronic form or format, personal information, as
defined in RSA 260:14, obtained from any license, unless authorized by the department").
93. See generally Id. at § 263:12(X) (hinting at the fact that the legislature realizes
scanning is a more accurate way of checking for valid identification and proof of age, but
placing the privacy of its citizens in front of that accuracy).
94. Id. at § 263:12(X) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person selling
alcohol or tobacco who uses due diligence in checking identification to prevent unauthorized sales and purchases of alcohol ad tobacco shall not be held responsible for the acceptance of fraudulent identification").
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license, but only with the original holder's consent. 9 5 This means the
license holder may give the information to someone else through handwritten or oral means, but not through scanning or swiping. 96 The New
Hampshire statute recognizes that there is a better way to verify that
drivers' licenses are not fraudulent or expired in determining proof of
age, but selects to protect the privacy of its constituent driver's license
97
holders to the utmost degree. The violation of the statute is a class A
misdemeanor. 98 In New Hampshire, a class A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment, probation, or fine. 9 9 The legality of this particular
section of the statute has not been challenged, and no causes of action
have been brought under its authority.
3.

Ohio Law

Ohio has enacted laws, as of September 21, 2000,100 that regulate
the swiping of identification cards for the purchase of either alcohol or
tobacco and for the entry into establishments that serve alcohol.101 The
10 2
statutes allow the business employee to perform a "transaction scan"
95. Id. at. § 263:12(X) ("Nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit a person from transferring, in non-electronic form or format, personal information contained on the face of a
license to another person, provided that the consent of the license holder is obtained if the
transfer is not to a law enforcement officer").
96. See generally N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263:12(X) (stating that license data can be
collected in non-electronic means).
97. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:9(IV)(a)(2) (2003) ("A class A misdemeanor is... (2) Any
crime designated within or outside this code as a misdemeanor, without specification of the
classification").
98. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 263:12 ("It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to..
99. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:2(I), (II)(c) (2003) ("(I) A person convicted of a felony or a
Class A misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprisonment, probation, conditional or unconditional discharge, or a fine. (II) If a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the court shall
fix the maximum thereof which is not to exceed: (c) One year for a class A misdemeanor.").
100. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021 (Anderson 2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61
(Anderson 2004).
101. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61.
102. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(A)(4) ("Transaction scan' means the process by
which a seller or an agent or employee of a seller checks, by means of a transaction scan
device, the validity of a driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card that
is presented as a condition for purchasing or receiving cigarettes or other tobacco products"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(A)(4)(a)(b) ("'Transaction scan' means the process by
which a permit holder or an agent of employee of a permit holder checks, by means of a
transaction scan device, the validity of a driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card that is presented as a condition for doing either of the following: (a) Purchasing any beer, intoxicating liquor, or low-alcohol beverage; (b) Gaining admission to a
premises that has been issued a liquor permit authorizing the sale of beer or intoxicating
liquor for consumption on the premises where sold, and where admission is restricted to
persons twenty-one years of age or older").
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by using a "transaction scan device" 10 3 to check the validity of the license
presented by the customer.' 0 4 If the information deciphered by the scan
does not match the information on the license or if the holder is not of
proper age, then the employee may not sell that person alcohol, tobacco,
or allow admittance into an establishment that serves alcohol. 10 5 The
business may only retain the data of certain specified fields. 10 6 The business may only store the name,' 0 7 date of birth, 0 8 and the license expira103. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(A)(5) ("Transaction scan device' means any commercial device or combination of devices used at a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip
or bar code of a driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card"); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4301.61(A)(5) ("Transaction scan device' means any commercial device or
combination of devices used at a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip or bar code of a
driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card").
104. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(B)(1) ("A seller or an agent or employee of a seller
may perform a transaction scan by means of a transaction scan device to check the validity
of a driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card holder
as a condition for selling, giving away, or otherwise distributing to the card holder cigarettes or other tobacco products"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(B)(1) ("A permit holder or
an agent or employee of a permit holder may perform a transaction scan by means of a
transaction scan device to check the validity of a driver's or commercial driver's license or
identification card presented by a card holder for either of the purposes listed in division
(A)(4)(a) or (b) of this section").
105. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(B)(2) ("If the information deciphered by the transaction scan performed under division (B)(1) of this section fails to match the information
printed on the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by the
card holder, or if the transaction scan indicates that the information so printed is false or
fraudulent, neither the seller nor any agent or employee of the seller shall sell, give away,
or otherwise distribute any cigarettes or other tobacco products to the card holder."); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(B)(2) ("If the information deciphered by the transaction scan performed under division (B)(1) of this section fails to match the information printed on the
driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by the card holder,
or if the transaction scan indicates that the information so printed is false or fraudulent,
neither the permit holder nor any agent or employee of the permit holder shall sell any
beer, intoxicating liquor, or low-alcohol beverage to the card holder").
106. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(1) ("No seller or agent or employee of a seller
shall electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a
transaction scan, except the following... ); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(1) ("No permit holder or agent or employee of a permit holder shall electronically or mechanically
record or maintain any information derived from a transaction scan, except the
following. .. ").
107. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(1)(a) ("The name.. .of the person listed on the
driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card holder");
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(1)(a) ("The name.. .of the person listed on the driver's or
commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card holder").
108. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(1)(a) ("The... date of birth of the person listed
on the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card
holder."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(1)(a) ("The... date of birth of the person listed
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tion date and identification number of the holder. 10 9 According to the
statute, the information may only be used to prove the performance of a
transaction scan, which constitutes an affirmative defense to selling to
an underage person. 1 10 The holder of this information may not share or
sell this data to any third party, including any entity for the purposes of
marketing, advertising, or promotional activities.1 1 1 The data may only
be released to another party pursuant to a court order. 1 12 If the scanning business stores more data than it is allowed to, or sells that data, it
is subject to a civil penalty up to one thousand dollars for each violation. 1 13 No one has challenged the legality of either statute in a court of
law, and no one has brought a case under its authority.
Ohio has also passed legislation that makes the performance of a
on the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card
holder").
109. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(1)(b) ("The expiration date and identification
number of the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a
card holder"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(1)(b) ("The expiration date and identification number of the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented
by a card holder").
110. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(2) ("No seller or agent or employee of a seller
shall use the information that is derived from a transaction scan or that is permitted to be
recorded and maintained under division (D)(1) of this section, except for purposes of section
2927.022 [2927.02.2] of the Revised Code"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(2) ("No permit holder or agent or employee of a permit holder shall use the information that is derived
from a transaction scan or that is permitted to be recorded and maintained by division
(D)(1) of this section, except for purposes of section 4301.611 [4301.61.1] of the Revised
Code").
111. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(4) ("No seller or agent or employee of a seller
shall sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any
third party, including, but not limited to, selling or otherwise disseminating that information for any marketing, advertising, or promotional activities"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4301.61(D)(4) ("No permit holder or agent or employee of a permit holder shall sell or
otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any third party,
including, but not limited to, selling or otherwise disseminating that information for any
marketing, advertising, or promotional activities").
112. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(D)(4) (".... but a seller or agent or employee of a
seller may release that information pursuant to a court order or as specifically authorized
by section 2927.022 [2927.02.2] or another section of the Revised Code"); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4301.61(D)(4) (".. .but a permit holder or agent or employee of a permit holder may
release that information pursuant to a court order or as specifically authorized by section
4301.611 [4301.61.1] or another section of the Revised Code").
113. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021(F) ("Whoever violates division (B)(2) or (D) of this
section is guilty of engaging in an illegal tobacco product transaction scan, and the court
may impose upon the offender a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars for each violation"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(F) (Whoever violates division (B)(2) or (D) of this
section is guilty of an illegal liquor transaction scan, and the court may impose upon the
offender a civil penalty of up to one thousand dollars for each violation").
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"transaction scan" an affirmative defense to the sale of tobacco 114 or alcohol 11 5 to an underage person. The business must prove that it took part
in several steps in order to claim the affirmative defense. 11 6 First, the
customer must have presented a driver's license or identification card
prior to the purchase. 11 7 Next, the employee must have performed a
"transaction scan" on the license that indicated it was valid.11L8 Finally,
the employee must have reasonably relied on the presentation of the license and the completed "transaction scan" in selling the tobacco1 19 or
alcohol 120 to the customer. The seller must still exercise reasonable diligence in determining the age of and whether the card presented is that of
the customer when examining the license or identification. 12 1 In Ohio,
114. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022 (Anderson 2004) (stating that the proper performance of a "transaction scan" acts as an affirmative defense to the sale of tobacco to a person
not of the legal age to purchase tobacco).
115. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611 (Anderson 2004) (stating that the proper performance of a "transaction scan" acts as an affirmative defense to the sale of alcohol to a person
not of the legal age to purchase alcohol).
116. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(A) ("A seller or an agent or employee of a seller
may not be found guilty of a charge of a violation of section 2927.02 of the Revised Code in
which the age of the purchaser or other recipient of cigarettes or other tobacco products is
an element of the alleged violation, if the seller, agent, or employee raises and proves as an
affirmative defense that all of the following occurred"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611(A)
("A permit holder or an agent or employee of a permit holder may not be found guilty of a
charge of a violation of this chapter or any rule of the liquor control commission in which
the age of a purchaser of any beer, intoxicating liquor, or low-alcohol beverage is an element of the alleged violation, if the permit holder, agent, or employee raises and proves as
an affirmative defense that all of the following occurred").
117. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(A)(1) ('A card holder attempting to purchase or
receive cigarettes or other tobacco products presented a driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611(A)(1) ("The card holder
attempting to purchase any beer, intoxicating liquor, or low-alcohol beverage presented a
driver's or commercial driver's license or an identification card").
118. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(A)(2) ("A transaction scan of the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card that the card holder presented indicated that
the license or card was valid"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611("A transaction scan of the
driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card that the card holder presented
indicated that the license or card was valid").
119. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(A)(3) ("The cigarettes or other tobacco products
were sold, given away, or otherwise distributed to the card holder in reasonable reliance
upon the identification presented and the completed transaction scan").
120. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611 ("The beer, intoxicating liquor, or low-alcohol beverage was sold to the card holder in reasonable reliance upon the identification presented
and the completed transaction scan").
121. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(B)(1)-(2) ... [T]he use of a transaction scan device does not excuse a seller or an agent or employee of a seller from exercising reasonable
diligence to determine, the following: (1) Whether a person to whom the seller or agent or
employee of a seller sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes cigarettes or other tobacco
products is eighteen years of age or older; (2) Whether the description and picture appearing on the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by a card
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the business owner cannot be held liable for selling tobacco or alcohol to
an underage person if all of these criteria are met.
4. Connecticut Law
Connecticut has laws, enacted in 2003, regulating scanning that are
very similar to the regulations in Ohio. In Connecticut, a "transaction
scan device"' 2 2 may be used to perform a "transaction scan" 123 in order
to determine the customer's age before the purchase of alcohol 12 4 or tobacco.' 25 The business may only record the patron's name, date of birth,
and the expiration date from the license or identity card.126 These data
fields may then be stored in a database for use as an affirmative defense
holder is that of the card holder"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611(B)(1)-(2) (". . . [T]he use
of a transaction scan device does not excuse a permit holder or an agent or employee of a
permit holder from exercising reasonable diligence to determine, the following:
(1) Whether a person to whom the permit holder or agent or employee of a permit holder
sells any beer or intoxicating liquor is twenty-one years of age or older or sells any lowalcohol beverage is eighteen years of age or older; (2) Whether the description and picture
appearing on the driver's or commercial driver's license or identification card presented by
a card holder is that of the card holder").
122. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(a)(4) (2003) ("'Transaction scan device' means any commercial device or combination of devices used at a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip
or bar code of a driver's license or an identity card"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(4) (2003)
("'Transaction scan device' means any commercial device or combination of devices used at
a point of sale that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip or bar code of a driver's license or an identity card.").
123. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(a)(3) ("'Transaction scan' means the process by which a
permittee or permittee's agent or employee checks, by means of a transaction scan device,
the validity of a driver's license or an identity card"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(3) ("'Transaction scan' means the process by which a seller or seller's agent or employee checks, by
means of a transaction scan device, the validity of a driver's license or an identity card.").
124. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(c)(1) ("A permittee or permittee's agent or employee may
perform a transaction scan to check the validity of a driver's license or identity card
presented by a cardholder as a condition for selling, giving away or otherwise distributing
alcoholic liquor to the cardholder").
125. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(d)(1) ("A seller or seller's agent or employee may perform
a transaction scan to check the validity of a driver's license or identity card presented by a
cardholder as a condition for selling, giving away or otherwise distributing tobacco to the
cardholder").
126. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(1) ("No permittee or permittee's agent or employee
shall electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a
transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth of the person listed
on the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder; (B) the expiration date
and identification number of the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(e)(1) (2003) (No seller or seller's agent or employee shall
electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information derived from a transaction scan, except the following: (A) The name and date of birth of the person listed on the
driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder; (B) the expiration date and identification number of the driver's license or identity card presented by a cardholder").
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in the instance of a sale to a minor, as long as the employee reasonably
relied on the scan.127 The business may not disseminate the stored information to any third parties for marketing, advertising, or promotional
activities. 1 28 The information may only be released pursuant to a court
order. 129 A civil penalty not to exceed one thousand dollars shall be imposed per instance for anyone who releases the information without such
a court order. 130 Again, neither of these statutes has been challenged in
a court of law, and no one has brought a lawsuit under the statutes.
5.

Other State Laws

Several other states have proposed, enacted and repealed, or enacted minimal regulating legislation dealing with scanning. Paralleling
both Ohio and Connecticut laws, New York actually passed legislation,
effective in 1999, which expressly granted a business the right to perform a "transaction scan" 13 1 on a customer's license before selling them
127. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(1) ("In any prosecution of a permittee or permittee's
agent or employee for selling alcoholic liquor to a minor in violation of subsection (b) of this
section, it shall be an affirmative defense that all of the following occurred: (A) A cardholder attempting to purchase or receive alcoholic liquor presented a driver's license or an
identity card; (B) a transaction scan of the driver's license or identity card that the cardholder presented indicated that the license or card was valid; and (C) the alcoholic liquor
was sold, given away or otherwise distributed to the cardholder in reasonable reliance upon
the identification presented and the completed transaction scan"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53344(f)(1) ("In any prosecution of a seller or seller's agent or employee for a violation of
subsection (b) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense that all of the following
occurred: (A) A cardholder attempting to purchase or receive tobacco presented a driver's
license or an identity card; (B) a transaction scan of the driver's license or identity card that
the cardholder presented indicated that the license or card was valid; and (C) the tobacco
was sold, given away or otherwise distributed to the cardholder in reasonable reliance upon
the identification presented and the completed transaction scan").
128. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(3) ("No permittee or permittee's agent or employee
shall sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any
third party for any purpose, including, but not limited to, any marketing, advertising or
promotional activities"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(e)(3) ("No seller or seller's agent or employee shall sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan
to any third party, including, but not limited to, selling or otherwise disseminating that
information for any marketing, advertising or promotional activities").
129. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(3) (". . .a permittee or permittee's agent or employee
may release that information pursuant to a court order."); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(e)(3)
("... a seller or seller's agent or employee may release that information pursuant to a court
order").
130. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(5) ("Any person who violates this subsection shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars."); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53344(e)(5) ("Any person who violates this subsection shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
more than one thousand dollars").
131. N.Y. Alcoholic Bev. Control Law § 65-b(1)(c) (2004) ("'Transaction scan' means the
process involving a device capable of deciphering any electronically readable format by
which a licensee, or agent or employee of a licensee under this chapter reviews a driver's
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alcoholic beverages. 132 The scanning of the identification card before the
purchase worked as an affirmative defense 13 3 for the employee, provided
that "reasonable diligence" was exercised in the transaction.' 3 4 For the
affirmative defense claim, the business could only store the necessary
identity fields of name, date of birth, driver's license or identification
card number, and expiration date.' 3 5 The entity could not sell or provide
the data to any third party for advertising, marketing, or promotional
purposes.136 The information could only be released pursuant to a court
order or some other type of statutory need. 13 7 Violation of the statute
was a civil penalty punishable by a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars. 138 The statute is however no longer in effect today. 139 The legislature enacted the statute as an amendment to an existing alcoholic
beverage control law, and included an expiration of January 1, 2004 devoid of renewal. 140 The legislature failed to renew the scanning sections,
and did not enact any subsequent legislation to replace it. Therefore,
license or non-driver identification card presented as a precondition for the purchase of an
alcoholic beverage as required by subdivision two of this section or as a precondition for
admission to an establishment licensed for the on-premises sale of alcoholic beverages
where admission is restricted to persons twenty-one years or older").
132. Id. at § 65-b(2)(b) ("Upon the presentation of such driver's license or non-driver
identification card issued by a governmental entity, such licensee or agent or employee
thereof may perform a transaction scan as a precondition to the sale of any alcoholic
beverage").
133. Id. at § 65-b(7)(a) ("In any proceeding pursuant to subdivision one of section sixtyfive of this article, it shall be an affirmative defense that such person had produced a
driver's license or non-driver identification card apparently issued by a governmental entity, successfully completed the transaction scan, and that the alcoholic beverage had been
sold, delivered or given to such person in reasonable reliance upon such identification and
transaction scan").
134. Id. at § 65-b(7)(a) ("Use of a transaction scan shall not excuse any licensee under
this chapter, or agent or employee of such licensee, from the exercise of reasonable diligence otherwise required by this section").
135. Id. at § 65-b(7)(b) ("A licensee or agent or employee of a licensee may electronically
or mechanically record and maintain only the information from a transaction scan necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section. Such information shall be limited to the
following: (i) name, (ii) date of birth, (iii) driver's license or non-driver identification number, and (iv) expiration date").
136. N.Y. Alcoholic Bev. Control Law § 65-b(8) ("No licensee or agent or employee of a
licensee shall resell or disseminate the information recorded during such scan to any third
person. Such prohibited resale or dissemination includes, but is not limited to, any advertising, marketing or promotional activities").
137. Id. at § 65-b(8) ("Notwithstanding the restrictions imposed by this subdivision,
such records may be released pursuant to a court ordered subpoena or pursuant to any
other statute that specifically authorizes the release of such information.").
138. Id. at § 65-b(8) ("Each violation of this subdivision shall be punishable by a civil
penalty of not more than one thousand dollars").
139. Id. at § 65-b.
140. Id. at § 65-b.
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currently in New York, the practice of scanning licenses and storing the
information is once again unregulated.
California's legislature proposed and discussed scanning laws in
2003.141 The California Assembly discussed and amended a bill that
would have put restrictions on who could scan, and on what information
could be stored and for how long. 142 However, the bill never passed as a
limitation on scanning. Oddly enough, the California legislature
amended the bill and passed it as a roof coverings law. 143 California
then also remains unregulated with respect to scanning.
A few other states have enacted legislation that does not regulate
scanning, but does incorporate it either as an affirmative defense to
criminal or civil suit or as a punishment. West Virginia has enacted legislation that allows a business that has installed a transaction scan device on its premises to use the performance of a transaction scan as an
affirmative defense to the sale of alcohol or tobacco to a minor. 14 4 The
state obviously allows scanning tacit in the statute's existence alone, but
there is nothing in any law regulating data retention or use. 14 5 Finally,
Oregon has developed the most unique use for scanning. The state allows scanning without any regulation on data recording or use. 14 6 What
is different is that Oregon has a statute that instead of imposing a fine or
suspension of liquor license for selling alcohol to a minor, allows the
state to force the business to "acquire and use equipment designed to
prevent sales of alcoholic beverages to minors." 14 7 Oregon actually uses
scanning technology as a means to punish businesses that have sold alcohol to underage persons in the past.
D.

FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES

Since the U.S. became a sovereign nation, the need to protect the
privacy of Americans has been a concern of the government. 148 With the
development of new technology the need for protection does not decrease,
141. Electronic Reading, supra n. 10.
142. Id.
143. 2004 Cal. Stat. 318.
144. W. Va. Code § 60-3A-25a (2004).
145. Id. at § 60-3A-25a.
146. Or. Rev. Stat. § 471.342 (2003).
147. Id. at § 471.342.
148. See U.S. Const. amend. I (recognizing a right to privacy as to which religion a person selects, what a person says in his or her speech, and in what the press publishes); U.S.
Const. amend. IV (recognizing a right of privacy amongst the people so that the government cannot enter their houses to search them or seize items without the proper authority);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (realizing that the Constitution does not explicitly mention
a right to privacy, but that through certain amendments and subsequent case law on those
amendments a right of privacy has been recognized).

382

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXIII

it only changes form. 149 With every new technological invention, such as
150
scanning, new privacy issues arise that must be addressed.
For more than thirty years, the government has been analyzing privacy concerns in the technology age. 15 1 In 1973, as the computer began
to be realized and widely used, the United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems developed the first "fair information practices." 152 The report acknowledged that with the advent of computers people's information could be stored in a way that it could not be in the past. 153 The
records would be much easier to store in a computer system and access
than in the past with only paper.1 5 4 This was the first realization that
computers were changing the collection of information, and in turn, privacy concerns would change as well. 155
In more recent years, with the development of the Internet and more
information being gathered online, the privacy principles have been up149. See FTC Report, supra n. 6 (describing that with the advent of electronic record
keeping the ability to collect and access personal data became much easier, and therefore
new standards needed set forth to regulate this new process).
150. See generally Lee, supra n. 1 (addressing numerous security and privacy issues
that have arisen from scanning).
151. See U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Recs, Computers and the Rights of
Citizens, 73-94 (July, 1973) (This report discusses privacy of personal information with the
advent of electronic data collection and storage devices, and it is more than thirty years
old).
152. Id. at sec. IV(III) (Among other regulations offered for the protection of information
the report detailed six rights of individual data subjects that are similar to the current
"Fair Information Practice Principles." The regulation calls for any organization that
maintains an automated data system to (1) inform the individual asked to supply personal
data whether he or she is legally required to do so, and to provide known consequences for
providing or not providing the data, (2) inform the individual, upon request, whether he or
she is the subject of data within the system, and provide the data to the individual if he or
she so desires it, (3) assure that the data in the system is not used in a manner other than
that stated to the individual without his or her consent, (4) inform the individual, upon his
request, about the uses of his or her data, and identify all people or organizations involved
with the system, (5) assure no data on the individual is made available by means of a
compulsory legal process, unless the individual has been notified of the demand, and (6)
maintain procedures that (i) allow the individual to contest the information's accuracy, pertinence, completeness, and necessity to retain, (ii) amend or correct data when the individual so requests, (iii) assure that when there is a dispute with an individual over a
correction or amendment to the data that the individual's claim is recorded and included in
any subsequent disclosures or disseminations of information); Jonathon P. Cody, Student
Author, ProtectingPrivacy Over the Internet: Has the Time Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1204 (1999).
153. See generally Recs, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, supra n. 151 (acknowledging that new technology allowed information to be stored and accessed in much more
efficient ways than in the past).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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dated. In June of 1998, the United States Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") presented a report to Congress detailing what has become
known as the "Fair Information Practice Principles" for the online gathering of data. 15 6 The FTC determined that there are five core principles
that all online information gatherers should follow to assure the person
whose information is being collected is sufficiently informed of the practice. 157 The principles include: (1) notice/awareness, (2) choice/consent,
(3) access/participation, (4) integrity/security, and (5) enforcement. 158
The report addressed these five principles and concluded that most websites were collecting online data from consumers, but were not providing
notice of the practice to them. 159 Although in violation of the principles,
the report acknowledged that without enforcement, the Web sites would
160
go unregulated and the practice would continue.
III.

ANALYSIS

The information encrypted on drivers licenses has many uses that
are both useful and worrisome. Law enforcement officers perform one
commendable use of swiping. 16 1 Police officers can use the card scanning technology to both save time and money in writing citation reports
and retrieving suspect background information. 16 2 Private enterprises
also use the technology of swiping in beneficial ways for both society and
for the benefit of the individual business. By scanning the ID, the business can immediately tell if the card is valid and if the holder is over the
age needed to purchase either alcohol or cigarettes. 163 This is beneficial
to society because it cuts down on the amount of underage people who
purchase alcohol, cigarettes, or gain entry into bars by illegally using
fake identification. 1 6 4 The bars and convenience stores then often store
156. Cody, supra n. 152 at 1209-1210; Jordan M. Blanke, "Safe Harbor"and the European Unioin'sDirective on Data Protection, 11 Albany L.J. of Sci. & Tech. 57, 69-70 (2000).
157. Cody, supra n. 152, at 1209-1210; Blanke, supra n. 156, at 70-72.
158. Cody, supra n. 152, at 1210; Blanke, supra n. 156, at 70-72; FTC Report, supra n. 6,
at III(A).
159. Blanke, supra n. 156, at 69-70.
160. FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III(A)(5)(a)-(c) (stating that the three types of regulation
for online gathering of data that allow the user redress are (a) "self-regulation" by the industry itself, (b) "private remedies" including legislation, and (c) "government enforcement"
that would be either civil or criminal in nature).
161. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [( 12], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
162. Id. at [1 12], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (stating police officers scan the driver's license during a traffic stop in order to produce an electronic
citation report and to retrieve the suspect's background information).
163. Christiansen, supra n. 2 at [%6]; Research, supra n. 7, at Who is Swiping?.
164. See Christiansen, supra n. 2 (describing the way swiping technology is cutting
down on the amount of underage people purchasing alcohol and cigarettes, and stating
implicitly how this is beneficial to society).
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the data in a computer database that can be very beneficial to the business for marketing purposes. 16 5 The business can then use the marketing record to determine what type of patrons come on certain nights, to
direct market to certain customers, and even to reject the admittance of
16 6
certain troublesome individuals.
Along with all the beneficial uses of the electronic information, there
are certain problem areas where security and privacy issues arise. Problem areas arise when the private enterprises begin collecting the data for
marketing purposes. 16 7 Most drivers' licenses have at least as much data
electronically encrypted as printed on them, and many have much
more.168 This information is much different in the possession of private
individuals from the control of law enforcement officers. 169 Law enforcement officers are generally considered some of society's most upstanding
citizens who would not misuse the private information he or she is privileged to obtain. They undergo rigorous background checks and deal with
sensitive data constantly to prepare them to handle exposure to such
confidential information. 170 However, private citizens are a different
story.
When individuals are allowed to easily access and store very private
and personal information, many dangers arise. 17 1 The first is the danger
of an employee using the data as an aid to commit violent crimes such as
stalking, rape, or even murder. 172 In addition, identity theft is becoming
more of a problem in our society everyday, and with this much personal
165. Lee, supra n. 1 at [

21-27].

166. Id. at [ 14-16, 31].
167. See generally Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html (describing how personal data is collected through transaction
scans and problems that arise when that data is subsequently used for marketing
purposes).
168. Id. at [ 11], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (stating some
states have social security numbers embedded on licenses, and Kentucky has encrypted a
digital image of the holder's picture on the license); Research, supra n. 7, at What Information is Encoded on Drivers' Licenses? (stating some states have digital fingerprints, signatures, and photos electronically embedded on licenses).
169. See generally Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html (citing the police uses for information obtained through swiping and commending them, while at the same time criticizing private enterprise uses of the
information gained through transaction scans).
170. See Of Taxes and Duties, infra n. 198, at 366 n. 74.
171. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [
23-24], http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
172. See Id. at [ 23], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (stating
that employees may access the personal data and compile lists of customers that could be
used to commit violent crimes).
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information available the temptation and risk abounds. 173 Finally, but
not as serious a threat, is the thoughts of receiving even more annoying
174
marketing phone calls, mail, or other direct marketing material.
There are also few security measures built into the process to protect
customers' information.
Currently some of the scanning manufacturers and some of the
states who produce the drivers' licenses include security features to stop
identity theft or violent crime. A few of the manufacturers of the scanning equipment include security features that are supposed to protect
the consumers' private information. 17 5 These measures are questionable
though. Some of the data on electronically encoded licenses is also encrypted in such a way that only law enforcement officers can access it,
but with higher security levels coming into effect after 9/11 that could
17 6
soon be changing to allow private industries access.
There are also questions raised as to what people's rights to privacy
are under the Fair Information Practice Principles. 17 7 In order for a business to collect and use personal information, it should follow these
guidelines to assure the individual's privacy is protected. 178 These
guidelines include; (1) giving notice to the individual that the information is being collected, (2) getting the person's consent or giving him/her
a choice as to how the information may be used, (3) allowing the person
to access the data about himself/herself to assure that it is accurate and
complete, (4) to assure that the data is safeguarded and secure, and finally (5) that there is some type of recourse to enforce the guidelines. 179
All of the beneficial uses of the information by private entities raise
concerning questions involving the privacy and safety of the general public that must be analyzed. Some type of legislation should be enacted,
not to completely prohibit the use of scanning by private businesses, but
to affirmatively limit the amount of personal information that can be accessed and retained by these entities. Scanning or swiping is a new
means of private entities getting your personal information. If the prac173. See Id. at [1 24], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (stating
that the Center for Democracy & Technology said that the potential for identity theft and
fraud are high at businesses that scan).
174. Swiping driver's licenses, supran. 1, at [%%1-3], http://www.seattlepress.com/print10148.html.
175. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52.
176. Id. (acknowledging that although the data is almost always encrypted in a way to
limit access to law enforcement agencies and other official uses that in a post 9/11/2001
world "certain private security uses of such data may be permitted by new laws and regulations as we go forward").
177. FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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tice is not addressed and regulated privacy in this area may be a thing of
the past.
A.
1.

BENEFICIAL USES OF SCANNING

Law Enforcement Uses

Law Enforcement officials perform one very beneficial use of swiping
drivers' licenses to access electronically encoded data.1 8 0 Law enforcement officers can use the technology in conjunction with private businesses to locate or obtain information about suspects.1 8 1 Officers are
also able to take advantage of the technology in the field to improve their
own safety, expedite a routine traffic stop and subsequent citation, and
by doing so make society safer.182
Private enterprise scanning really assists law enforcement in two
ways. First, when a business swipes a license, the time and date of the
18 3
transaction scan are recorded along with the personal information.
This data can then be used to aid law enforcement officers in apprehending suspects. If a law enforcement officer calls or visits a business
with demographic information of a suspect, the business could instantly
run a database query to determine if the person had been to the business
recently.18 4 Also, a police department could call the business with only a
name or social security number to see if the name is in the private
180. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1 101, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html (stating that scanning licenses makes life easier for law enforcement
officers and makes them more efficient); Bob Howie, Oak Ridge to update court software;
Old system slows processing of information, The Houston Chronicle Sec. This Week Pg. 3
(June 24, 2004) (discussing that scanning enables a police officer to save time and write
citations more efficiently); Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16, at Introduction (acknowledging that law enforcement officer who swipe are more efficient, and provide better
safety for society while also increasing their own safety).
181. Lee, supra n. 1 at [ 10] (stating that law enforcement officers can call private
businesses to see if certain names or social security numbers appear on their customer
lists); see generally Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 15], http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
182. Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16; Oak Ridge to update court software; Old
system slows processing of information, supra n. 180, at [ 6-9] (illustrating how a police
officer can use the technology to decrease the time taken for a routine traffic stop); Great
Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [% 12], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,
00.html (stating that scanning makes life easier for law enforcement officers).
183. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1 15], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html (illustrating how when a person comes into a business and their license is swiped that the scanning equipment records the time and date of the transaction
in addition to the encoded license data).
184. Lee, supra n. 1 at [1 101 (illustrating that the equipment has already proved useful
in law enforcement because police departments have called bars with names and social
security numbers to see if the information shows up on the customer list.).
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database, and then access this information.1 8 5 Law enforcement could
use a private database to access a person's address, telephone number,
or other personal information. Both of these uses allow law enforcement
to work more efficiently in apprehending suspects and makes society a
safer place, but is not without drawbacks. Under these circumstances
and uses, some argue that a de facto national identity card and national
personal information database would then be created.1 8 6 If the police
did not have your information, they could just call local bars, restaurants, and convenience stores until they found it. The most alarming
thought is that the database would not be controlled by the government,
but by corporate America.
A second, and less controversial use, by law enforcement officers of
swiping takes place by police officers in the field. Many officers are
equipped with either handheld PDA-style computers or laptops that are
connected to informational databases through wireless Internet connections. 187 The computer has software on it that allows the officer to
merely swipe the offender's driver's license and instantly have the citation report information filled in.' 8 8 The citation is then printed by a
handheld printer the officer also carries. 18 9 The officer saves a great
deal of time and reduces the chance for human error by not having to
manually write in the criteria required on the citation. 190 He or she is
able to get back onto the streets to patrol much faster. 19 1 The patrolman
also improves his or her own safety by not having to take his or her eyes
off of the offender for several minutes to manually write out a citation,
192
the scanning only takes a few seconds.
The mobile computers can also access informational databases over
wireless Internet connections. 193 This allows the officer to scan the of94
fender's license to instantly check his or her background information.1
The officer can discover if the person has a history of offenses, or if he or
185. See generally Id. at [1 10] (If a law enforcement officer can use a bar's database to
discover if a suspect has recently visited the establishment, then the law enforcement officer could just as easily, and as a logical next step in apprehension, use the bar to obtain
all of the customer's data from the database retained.).
186. Id. at [1 11] (discussing that privacy advocates argue that a de facto national security card or internal passport is being created that will be registered in numerous
databases); Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 26], http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
187. Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16, at 1-2.
188. Id. at 1-2.
189. Id. at 1-2.
190. Id. at 6-7.
191. Id. at 6-7.
192. Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16, at 6-7.
193. Id. at 1-2.
194. Id. at 6-7.
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she has any outstanding warrants. 19 5 All of this is done in real time for
the freshest most up to date information available, allowing the officer to
be as safe and efficient as possible. 19 6 The scanning also allows the officer to instantly access very basic information such as if the license is
valid, if the offender is a minor, etc. 19 7 This could help in identifying
some adult offenders, and would be especially helpful in identifying minors guilty of committing certain age related offenses such as underage
drinking, smoking, or curfew violations.
Overall, the use of scanning by law enforcement officers should be
encouraged, and is one of the intended uses for electronically encoded
information on drivers' licenses. The practice makes society safer, and
more efficient. There is very little risk that a police officer is going to
keep the offender's data to commit a violent crime against him, or to
steal his identity. Law enforcement officers often deal with sensitive
personal data, but they have underwent a thorough background check
and are sworn to an oath to uphold the law to assure they are people who
can be trusted with such information. 198 Employees and owners of private businesses are not subject to the same type of precautionary measures, and are not viewed in the same way. Therefore, sensitive personal
information in the hands of a law enforcement officer is much different
than in the possession of a private business.
2.

Private Business

Many private businesses that must check the age of their patrons or
customers for the purchase of alcohol or tobacco are currently using scanning technology. 19 9 The technology not only helps decrease human error
and customer wait time, but it exponentially increases the chances that
an underage person will be identified and prevented from purchasing al195. Id. at 6-7.
196. Id. at 6-7.
197. See generally Electronic Citation Systems, supra n. 16, at 1-2 (If all of the person's
background information can be checked when the license is scanned, then the scanner
could also determine if the license is fraudulent, and if the holder is a minor).
198. See Kenneth H. Ryesky, Of Taxes and Duties: Taxing the System with Public Employees' Tax Obligations,31 Akron L. Rev. 349, 366 n. 74 (1998) (citing the fact that a police
officer undergoes a rigorous background check and is sworn to uphold the law... "Those in
law enforcement have a heightened duty to obey all the laws and to set an example for
others, not to brazenly declare that they are somehow above the law...").
199. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443; Lee, supra n. 1 at [J%1-41; Great Taste, Less Privacy,
supra n. 1, at [%13], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (realizing that
bars and restaurants scan IDs to catch underage drinkers, and convenience stores scan
them verify the age of cigarette buyers); Christiansen, supra n. 2, at [ 5-6].
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cohol or tobacco. 20 0 Many bars, restaurants, liquor stores, and convenience stores now employ the technology to help stop the purchase and
consumption of alcohol and tobacco by underage persons. 20 1 The businesses can also store the electronic information in computerized customer databases. 20 2 The information can then be used for marketing
purposes, to analyze the client base, or to aid law enforcement officers by
20 3
keeping a record of when people visited certain locations.
Underage drinking is a large problem in many areas, but with the
use of barcodes and magnetic strips with electronically encoded data on
them and with more scanning devices being used by bars, the problem is
diminishing. 20 4 Many underage people are able to purchase high-quality, fraudulent identification cards that allow them to purchase alcohol
and gain admittance to bars. 20 5 The new technology allows the business
owners to either swipe the magnetic strip or scan the barcode in order to
instantly access the encoded data and determine if the license is valid
and the age of the holder.20 6 With the scanning equipment, the business
is able to determine an identification card is fake that would probably
otherwise pass a physical examination by an employee. 20 7 It is virtually
impossible to produce a license with a fraudulent magnetic strip or
barcode. 20 8 Many convenience store owners are using the technology to
attack the similar problem of underage people attempting to purchase
200. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 (acknowledging that scanning helps reduce human error,
reduces the wait time of patrons wanting to purchase alcohol or tobacco or gain entry into a
bar, and automatically detects underage persons or fraudulent identification).
201. Id. at 443 (citing the fact that numerous private entities are scanning, and more
begin the practice each day).
202. Id. at 443 (stating that the bar's management may retain the scanned customer
information in its own customer database).
203. Lee, supra n. 1.
204. See Christiansen, supra n. 2 (The same underage woman gained access to a saloon
on numerous occasions using a fake ID. After the saloon employed the use of swiping technology, the ID was confiscated and she was denied access.).
205. Id. at [T 3] (illustrating that underage college students can often purchase highquality fraudulent IDs for less than $100); Roger Johnson, F.A.B. IDs: Detecting Fake,
Altered, and Borrowed Cards, Law Enforcement Bulletin, Focus on Training, [H 51 (February 1997) (available online at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1997/feb972.htm) (A
study on the prevalence of underage people who have fraudulent identification discovered
that as many as twenty-two percent of University of Wisconsin at Madison students have
false identification cards allowing them to purchase alcohol and enter bars. Some University of Wisconsin police officers estimate the number of students possessing fake identification cards to be as high as fifty percent).
206. Christiansen, supra n. 2, at [$1 6-7] (illustrating that the machines can automatically tell if the ID is real because if it is not an error message will appear on the screen).
207. Id. at [H 21] (stating that many fake IDs sold are of "good quality" and could pass
all the validity checks except the ones using the bar codes and magnetic strips).
208. See generally Id. (stating that the only way that many fake IDs are detected is by
scanning them).
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20 9

alcohol or tobacco.
Another benefit, particularly for bar and restaurant owners, is the
storing of the electronic data in computer databases for marketing purposes. 2 10 An owner can instantly create charts that show statistics of
patrons who visit on certain nights.2 1 1 For example a bar owner can run
a query to see what the male to female ratio is on a given night, or to see
what age most of the people are who come in to watch a certain musical
performance. 2 12 This information can then be used to market future
similar performances to those patrons or similar patrons, or to attempt
to change customer balances on certain nights by running different promotions. 2 13 The data is also very lucrative in negotiating with alcohol
companies over promotions. 2 14 Convenience stores can use similar tech215
nology to build databases for direct marketing purposes.
The practice of directly marketing customers has advantages for society. Patrons are able to receive notice of events that match their specific interests. 2 16 In the past where people may have missed certain
events because they did not know of them, now there would be a direct
means of contact to alert a customer of musical performances, promotional events, or other activities that the person would find interest209. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 (citing that an increasing amount of convenience stores
are relying on scanning technology to avoid illegal sales of alcohol or tobacco to minors).
210. Lee, supra n. 1, at [
21-271.
211. Id. at [
21-27].
212. Id. at [ 21-27] (giving examples of how bar owners use the scanning technology
to pinpoint the demographics of their crowds on certain nights). Id. A bar owner uses the
database to determine that on Tuesdays, the amount of forty-something patrons increases
because of the jazz music being played. Id. On Thursdays, the crowd is almost entirely
from the upscale Boston ZIP codes of 02109, 02111, and 02113 who come to hear the band
Cat Tunes, a band well known among those who visit Martha's Vineyard. Id. On Sundays
women make up sixty percent of the customers because Chad LaMarch performs, and
"[t]he men always follow the women." Id.
213. Id. at [1$ 21-27] (stating the information can be used to look at crowd
demographics or to give customers who frequent the establishment special treatment, similar to the way an airline would give extra benefits to a frequent flier).
214. Id. at [
21-27] (discussing how the demographic information can be valuable to
the owner of the club). Id. The statistics can be used to show an alcohol supplier the
demographics of the customer base for a certain night in order to gain leverage for the bar
owner in terms of promotions. This information can be used to guarantee the supplier has
the people it wants at a certain promotion, and it will in turn be worth more money to the
supplier to pay the bar owner to run the promotion on a certain night.
215. Lee, supra n. 1, at [
21-27] (quoting an owner of over 100 convenience stores in
Minnesota and Wisconsin who recently installed scanning technology in all of his convenience stores: "Any marketing tool that we have that makes us different than our competition is an advantage ... [w]e could do direct marketing to people who are smokers. .. ").
216. Id. at [
21-27]; Swiping driver's licenses, supra n. 1 at [1 3], http://www.seattlepress.com/print-10148.html.
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ing. 2 17 The situation would resemble having a socialite friend who knew
your specific tastes in addition to the local entertainment scene and
could alert you of events you would want to attend.
Allowing the private entities to collect only non-identifiable data for
marketing or customer demographic purposes is another option. Business owners would be able to collect demographic data such as age,
weight, sex, zip code, city, etc.; but nothing identifiable such as name,
address, social security number, driver's license identification number,
etc. This would still enable businesses to determine what type of customer and from where the customer was patronizing, 2 18 but would not
allow any type of personal identifiable data to be transmitted. For example a bar owner could see what the ratio of male-to-female customers was
on Friday night, or see what age most of the people were that visited on
Tuesday night from the information. 2 19 However, there would be no personal identifiable information to allow direct marketing to these recent
customers, so the information would be of limited use. The customers
would be protected from the dangers of identity theft and violent crime
associated with divulging personal information though, because there
would be no information in the database to personally identify them.
Finally, there are some security controls that are beneficial to the
storeowner, and also to law enforcement. 2 20 A bar owner that wants to
keep a troublesome patron from entering the establishment can simply
program the computer to reject his or her license. 22 1 Since the time and
date are recorded when the license is swiped, the business owners can
222
All of
also use this information to assist law enforcement officers.
these uses benefit many people; however, the benefits of these scenarios
do not outweigh the dangerous side effects of allowing private enterprises to collect sensitive data that is not necessary to accomplish their
primary purpose of age verification.
217. See generally Lee, supran. 1, at [ 21-27] (describing how a bar owner can discern
the demographics on any particular night in order to advertise certain events to individuals
who are in certain demographic groups); Swiping driver'slicenses, supra n. 1 at [1 4], http://
www.seattlepress.com/print-10148.html (describing how a club could use personal information collected from a transaction scan to pinpoint that person's interests and in turn market certain bands or other types of performances directly to that person).
218. Lee, supra n. 1, at [M 21-27]; Swiping driver's licenses, supra n. 1 at (1 4].
219. See generally Lee, supra n. 1, at [ 21-27] (stating how a club owner can use the
collected data to survey what demographic groups visit the establishment on certain nights
or for certain events).
220. Id. at [99 10, 31].
221. Id. at [1 31] (giving the example that simply "knowing that a quarrelsome man is
named Greg and lives in a specific town can be enough information to lock someone out").
222. Id. at [%10] (stating explicitly that law enforcement officers could call a bar to see
if a suspect's name or social security number show up on the customer list, and implicitly
that the law enforcement officer could then obtain whatever data the business held on that
particular person).
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SIDE-EFFECTS OF SCANNING

Violent Crime

Although there are many beneficial uses to swiping and to businesses creating customer databases, there are also many dangers of hav223
ing extremely private information in the hands of private individuals.
The most dangerous of all the risks is the possibility the database information could be used for the commission of violent crimes. 224 All the
societal benefits gained through businesses restricting underage patrons
and marketing via swiping and data retention could be offset by the com225
mission of one rape or murder.
The amount of personal information businesses that swipe IDs store
in their private databases is startling. 2 26 Some of the businesses store
addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, and any other information that can be decoded by the scanner from the license. 227 The security of the databases themselves and the software used to run them is
also questionable. 2 28 Most bar employees can access the data, and sub2 29
sequently use it for their own purposes.
A few scanning manufacturers are aware of the problems of personal
information being abused and only allow clients to view and store certain
encoded data.2 30 The problem here, though, is that the equipment man223. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,
62182,00.html.
224. See generally Id. at [1 231 (implying that after a bar or restaurant employee made a
list of female patrons' personal information that list could be used not just for stalking, but
for other criminal purposes).
225. See generally Id. (stating that there is a possibility of an employee of a business
that scans creating a personal list of customer information from the entity's customer
database, and that the DPPA was enacted because people used the state DMVs to obtain
personal information to commit murder or other crimes).
226. See generally Id. at [TT 1-5] (citing an experiment where patrons at an event had
their licenses swiped and afterward were alarmed by the amount of information that was
obtained from this swipe).
227. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 (illustrating that licenses contain data including name,
address, birth date, height, eye color, and social security number, and that many private
2-41 (stating
businesses retain this data from a transaction scan); Lee, supra n. 1, at [
that name, address, birth date, height, eye color, and social security number can be electronically encoded on licenses and that this personal information can be stored in a computer database following a transaction scan).
228. See generally Lee, supra n. 1, at [ 23-38] (citing no security precautions taken by
private business owners who scan and subsequently store personal data).
23-38] (citing no security measures that bar or restaurant
229. See generally Id. at [
owners take to ensure that only employees who should have access to the personal data are
the only ones who have access to the data).
230. Id. at [N 36] (giving examples of how some scanning technology manufacturers
limit the amount of information their clients have access to in order to protect the patron's
safety). Id. (The Logix Company (a scanner manufacturer) only allows clients like bars to

20051

SWIPING AWAY YOUR PRIVACY

ufacturer has no more need or right to the data than does their client. It
becomes a situation akin to inmates running the prison.
A majority of companies, however, allow businesses to store all of
the database information locally, with all employees gaining easy access. 23 1 With the information stored locally, there is little to stop an employee from creating personal lists of potential victims to stalk, rape, or
murder. 23 2 An employee of a bar, for example, could create a list of blond
female customers between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five that
weigh 120 pounds that includes all of their contact information. 2 33 The
thought of someone doing this purely for stalking purposes is scary
enough, but far worse crimes could occur. 2 34 The DPPA was in fact
passed for the very reason of an obsessed fan receiving address information on Rebecca Schaeffer from the DMV that he used to stalk and murder her. 2 3 5 Some businesses may not even look at the stored
information, or may use it in a proper manner. 23 6 However, some will
not use the data responsibly, so action to prevent such abuses must be
taken. 23 7 The only way to stop the people who will use the information
incorrectly is to regulate what information can be accessed and stored by
everyone. The alternative could result in severe consequences for innocent customers of not just violent crime, but also of having their entire
bank account emptied or credit ruined through identity theft.
2.

Identity Theft

Another threat to patrons when their personal information is obtained by private entities is identity theft. It is an ever-increasing pheview aggregate information and not specific data to prevent a situation where "a bouncer at
a bar stalks a blond, 20-year-old, 5-foot-7 girl." A sales manager with Logix Company
stated, "[als a company we want to take responsibility for who has responsibility for this
information").
231. Id. at [$ 37] (stating that Intelli-Check, and most manufacturers, allow their clients to store all customer data locally).
232. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [T 23], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
233. Id. at [9 23] (giving another example of how a bar employee could create a list of all
the blond female customers who are between the ages of 21 and 25 who weigh 120 pounds
for stalking or other violent crime purposes).
234. See generally Id. at [9123] (stating implicitly that since a crazed fan obtained information about Ms. Schaeffer that was used to murder her from the state DMV that an employee of a private business who scans and retains a customer database could just as easily
obtain such data from the entity's database).
235. Id.
236. Lee, supra n. 1, at [ 91 37-39] (quoting a bar owner who uses the scanning technology: "Will I use it in the wrong way? No. But then again, what is to stop the next guy?").
237. Id. at [9T 37-39].
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nomenon in the United States, 23 8 which demonstrates no signs of
stopping or slowing down. 2 3 9 Currently more than seven million people
are the victim of identity theft in the United States every year. 240 That
241
equals the startling number of more than thirteen thefts per minute.
The total cost of this crime in the United States approaches fifty billion
dollars. 242 Allowing private enterprises to continue to scan drivers' licenses and retain the data could increase the identity theft statistics.
These businesses scan drivers' licenses that contain very personal data;
the type of data that people attempting to commit identity theft wish to
243
acquire.
The driver's license is often the means through which an identity
thief can best procure the identity. 244 In addressing the issue of identity
theft, the California legislature stated that "identity theft is often 'facilitated through the procurement of a counterfeit or fraudulently-obtained
driver's license since the license is a 'breeder document' for all sorts of
assets and benefits: loans, bank accounts, credit cards, etc.' 24 5 '[Tihe
driver's license remains an attractive tool for identity thieves and will no
doubt continue to be the target of those seeking to commit fraud.'"246 By
allowing private enterprises to retain all the information encrypted on a
driver's license, the opportunity for someone to use this data for identity
theft is far too easy.
The potential for fraud in the storing of the information is great because of the ease that third parties can acquire the data. 24 7 Since a twodimensional barcode and magnetic strip can be read with a handheld
238. Identity Theft Resource Center, Facts & Statistics, http://www.idtheftcenter.org
facts.shtml at [H1
3] (last updated Feb. 15, 2004) (showing the amount of identity theft victims increased between eleven and twenty percent from the year 2001 to the year 2002,
and the amount of victims increased eighty percent from the year 2002 to the year 2003).
239. Id. at [H1
3] (stating that ninety-one percent of people do not see an end to identity
theft, and actually expect a heavy increase in the number of victims).
240. Id. at [H1
3] (last updated February 15, 2004) (according to two studies performed in
July 2003, seven million people had their identity stolen in the United States since July
2002).
241. Id. at [9 31 (last updated February 15, 2004) (showing that if seven million people
had their identity stolen in the United States between July 2002 and July 2003 that
equaled 19,178 thefts per day, 799 per hour, and 13.3 per minute).
242. Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft Survey Report, http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2003/09/synovatereport.pdf, at 6 (September, 2003).
243. See generally Cal. Assembly Comm. on Jud. 224, p. 4, 2003-2004, (Mar. 4, 2003)
(stating that the information contained on drivers' licenses is the type of data that an identity thief would want to acquire, and that a drivers' license is a "breeder document" for
access to numerous assets and benefits).
244. Electronic Reading, supra n. 10 at 4; Swiping driver'slicenses, supra n. 1 at [914].
245. Electronic Reading, supra n. 6, at 4.
246. Id. at 4.
247. Id. at 4; Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [9 24], http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (stating that the potential for fraud and identity theft is
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scanner, an employee can scan the license a second time with a personal
scanner to generate a copy of the information. 2 48 He could then use the
stored data either to commit an identity theft, or sell the data to someone
else who would like to commit such a crime. 24 9 Obtaining the equipment
needed for scanning is very simple, and there are no perquisites required
the
for purchase. 250 Most scanning manufacturers have websites where
251
All
equipment can be purchased for as little as few hundred dollars.
and
name
for
address,
card,
a
mailing
that is required is a valid credit
2 52
stolen,
or
inforNot very many identities must be
online purchases.
mation for the theft need to be sold to recoup this minimal

expenditure .253
Employees may obtain the data for identity theft purposes in other
manners. Even if the card is swiped via fixed position swiping technology, the information is still accessible. 2 54 Some equipment produces a
written receipt of the transaction, and almost all systems present a digital display of the encoded information. 25 5 An employee or someone
standing nearby could take the receipt, copy the receipt, or write down
high for businesses that perform transaction scans according to the Center for Democracy
& Technology).
248. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1 24], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html (stating that since many private entities use handheld scanners it
would be easy for an employee to purchase a handheld scanner of his or her own and scan a
license twice, the second time retaining the data for his or her own benefit).
249. See generally Id. (stating implicitly that once the employee scans a license a second
time for his own benefit that the employee would then use the information to commit identity theft or sell the information to someone who would commit such a theft).
250. Token Works, Store, http://www.cardvisor.com/default.htm (last accessed Nov. 12,
2004).
251. Id. (showing that the scanners can be purchased for relatively small sums of
money). Id. Handheld scanners, which come with software to store swiped data, are priced
as little as three hundred and ninety-five dollars. This model (CardVisor I) will only read
magnetic stripes and only stores license number, date of birth, expiration date, status of
the swipe, and date and time of the swipe. The model measures only 1" x 6" x 3" and runs
for 6,000 plus scans on two standard AAA batteries. Models that are more expensive capture and store the aforementioned fields as well as contact information such as name, title,
address, city, state, zip, and gender. Models that also read two-dimensional barcodes are
available starting at $1,145 dollars (CardVisor I-BC).
252. Id. at Store (illustrating the simplicity and low cost of obtaining a handheld scanner to perform transaction scans on licenses by an ordinary person).
253. See generally Identity Theft Survey Report, supra n. 242, at 6 (stating that the average identity thief fraudulently obtains $10,200 worth of goods and services in the commission of each theft). Id. If the average identity thief obtains $10,200 worth of goods and
services from every commission of a theft, and the cost of scanning equipment is only a few
hundred dollars, then it takes less than one "average" theft to not only recoup the cost of
the scanning equipment, but also to make a hefty profit.
254. Electronic Reading, supra n. 10 at 4.
255. Id. at 4.
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the information for later personal or sales use. 2 5 6 Finally, if the information is stored in a database, an employee could access the data and use it
for identity theft, or sell it to a third party who would like to commit
identity theft. 2 5 7 Individuals' scanned data is usually transferred onto
an ordinary desktop or laptop computer, the access to which only the
258
business controls.
The more information a person has the easier it is to commit identity
theft. 259 For example if an identity thief has a driver's license number,
name, address, age, height, weight, etc., all information usually electronically encoded on a license, the thief can "steal" an identity in a couple
different ways. First, he could use the obtained information in an attempt to gain access to existing credit cards, bank accounts, or other personal financial funds. 2 60 Second, the thief could also use the information
to create an entirely new and fraudulent driver's license that could be
used to open any number of credit cards or bank accounts. 26 1 Since some
states encode data that is even more personal, such as social security
number, on their licenses for the establishments to collect, it makes the
thiefs job that much easier. The risks to a person's life, financial security, and credit history are far too great to have such extremely private
information in the possession of people who do not absolutely require it.
3. Direct Marketing
Another telemarketing phone call, mailbox full of "junk-mail", or an
e-mail account full of "spam" e-mail is life in the twenty-first century. A
third, but less serious result of scanning and storing the data from a
256. See generally Id. at 4 (stating that the identifying information of a customer could
easily be obtained by a third party even if the business entity scanning does not share it via
the scanning equipments printout or display).
257. See generally Id. at 4 (stating that the driver's license is an attractive document for
identity thieves because the information contained on it is very valuable in gaining access
to private assets or benefits); Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 24], http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html (commenting on how easy it would be for an
employee of an establishment that swiped to take the personal information and sell it to a
third party).
258. See Token Works, FAQ, http://www.cardvisor.com/default.htm (last accessed Nov.
12, 2004) (stating that although a computer is not required, the device will download the
data to an ordinary desktop or laptop in Microsoft Excel format).
259. See generally Electronic Reading,supra n. 10 at 4 (hinting at the fact that the more
information that is contained on a driver's license, the more information an identity thief
can procure from such license, and the easier it is for the thief to then steal the identity).
260. See Id. (listing items that an identity thief may be able to access with the information from a driver's license, including loans, bank accounts, and credit cards); Plouff asks,
'What's in a name?," supra n. 259 at [1 61 (acknowledging the fact that with the driver's
license information criminals can access a person's credit, or worse yet start new credit in
that person's name).
261. Id.
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customer's driver's license is the increase of direct marketing that a person will receive. 2 6 2 Although some of the marketing material may be
useful to the patron such as coupons, discounts, or information about
special performances, 26 3 a majority will result in more headaches for an
already overloaded audience when it comes to direct marketing. A majority of the material the customer receives will end up in the trash,
blocked by a "spam" blocker, or as a deleted message on an answering
machine. The nuisance of more marketing is not appealing; especially at
the risk of privacy invasion, violent crimes, or identity theft. The sum
total of all three risks necessitates that regulations be imposed, particularly because present technical safeguards are insufficient to protect the
public.
C.

EQUIPMENT SAFEGUARDS

Some of the equipment used in scanning, and some of the licenses
themselves are supposed to have security features built into them that
would prevent the private information encoded on drivers' licenses from
falling into the wrong person's hands. 26 4 Certain highly sensitive material, such as biometric information, is supposedly encrypted in a way
that most ordinary scanners cannot read it.265 Other states, such as Illinois, claim they encode the license data in a way that only the Secretary
of State's office or a law enforcement officer can read the biometric
data. 2 6 6 With the advent of newer scanning technology and new laws in
our society's ever increasing struggle for security this information may
become accessible to private businesses. 2 67 In a recent exhibition using
scanning equipment available to the general public information includ262. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [
14-16], http://www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html; Lee, supra n. 1 at [ 21-31]; Swiping driver'slicenses, supra
n. 1 at [1 4]; Chung, supra n. 1 at 443.
263. Swiping driver's licenses, supra n. 1 at [I 4]; Lee, supra n. 1 at [
21-31]; Chung,
supra n. 1 at 443.
264. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52, at q. 8; Lee, supra n. 1 at [%%32-37].
265. Frequently Asked Questions, supra n. 52, at q. 8 (describing that driver's license
biometric data is almost always encrypted to allow only law enforcement officers and official users access); Lee, supra n. 1 at [%J 32-33] (stating that most scanning equipment is
not designed to read biometric information such as digital fingerprints, digital signature,
and electronic photographs).
266. CyberDrive Illinois, New Look... New Technology! Illinois' New Driver's Licenses
and ID Cards, http://www.sos.state.il.us/departments/drivers/programs/digital.html (last
accessed October 30, 2004) (alerting people that the encrypted data of the new Illinois
driver's license and identification card can only be accessed by the Secretary of State's office and by law enforcement).
267. FrequentlyAsked Questions, supran. 52, at q. 8 (acknowledging that in the wake of
9/11/2001 "new laws and regulations may allow the private uses of biometric data to help
increase security"); Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [
1-9], http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,62182,00.html.
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ing phone number, income range, marital status, housing value, address,
and profession were obtained from scanning drivers' licenses. 268 Scanning technology and the laws are advancing too rapidly to leave the sensitive biometric data unregulated, or poorly regulated as is currently the
case by the individual states, in its capture.
Some scanning equipment manufacturers recognize there is a privacy and safety issue with personal information being made available to
private businesses. 26 9 The Logix Company, for example, is a manufacturer of swiping technology that self-regulates the information that some
of its clients have access to. 2 7 0 The company does not allow clients like
27 1
bars to view specific data, but only aggregate customer information.
The data is stored offsite in a Logix database so it can regulate what the
bars can access. 272 The self-regulation is commendable in the acceptance of the scanning equipment provider that there is a privacy issue,
and trying to prevent it. However, it does not get around the problem
that the Logix company still has a database of the entire bar customers'
private information. The scanning equipment manufacturer has no
more right to access the data than the bar owner. Most equipment dealers do not implement this practice anyway, and the business owner is
273
allowed to store and access any data so chosen.
268. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supran. 1, at [TT 1-9], http://www.wired.com/news/print/
0,1294,62182,00.html (giving an example of how easily personal information can be obtained from the license itself or from the information contained on the license). Id. An
exhibition at the Pittsburgh Center for the Arts was held by a private enterprise, which
used scanners that are available to the general public to scan driver's licenses. The enterprise was able to decode information off the license that amounted to or led to the discovery
of phone numbers, income range, marital status, housing value, profession, and address.
The license contained enough data that the enterprise could use a commercial data mining
service or voter registration to gain access to the remainder of the information not included
on the card.
269. Lee, supra n. 1 at [TT 36-39]; See Electronic Reading, supra n. 10 at 4 (realizing
that some scanning systems only allow the user to calculate the cardholder's age and the
equipment only displays a 'yes purchase" or "no purchase" indication, but other systems
allow the user to print out information and store information in a database).
270. Lee, supra n. 1 at [1 36]; Memphis Business Journal, Concord EFS acquires Logix,
http://www.bizjournals.com/memphis/stories/2002/03/04/dailyl.html, [%10] (Mar. 4, 2002.).
271. Id. at [R 36] (accepting that a situation where a bouncer at a bar could get information on a twenty year old five-foot-seven blond girl and then stalk her, the Logix company
only allows clients like bars to view aggregate customer data and not user specific personal
information).
272. Id. at [R 36-37] (inferring that because of the way Logix Company only allows certain data to be accessed by bars, it must not allow client data storage on site). Id. The
Logix Company only allows certain information to be accessed by its clients. The author
then states that most manufacturers allow the information to be stored locally. Therefore,
the Logix Company must not allow data storage on site.
273. Id. at [j 36-37] (Most companies, like Intelli-Check, allow the clients to store all
the license data locally, which allows them easy access to specific data).

20051

SWIPING AWAY YOUR PRIVACY

The only way equipment safeguards could really regulate scanning
was if there was an industry standard or regulation that limited the
amount of information that could be obtained and stored off identification cards; or if all the states encoded private data in a way that scanners
could not read it. It is unlikely manufacturers will change their equipment to only decode certain data voluntarily though, because many
equipment manufacturers actually advertise their products as being able
to store mass quantities of customer information for marketing purposes. 27 4 There would also still be a problem because there would be
countless older technology scanners that could decode private data still
in the possession of business owners. It would be very difficult, if not
impossible, for the industry itself to regulate the use of this previously
sold equipment.
The states regulating themselves, as far as encoding private data so
a scanner cannot decode it, is another option. All fifty states producing
licenses that encode personal data so it cannot be read by scanners is
more probable, but still difficult. It would be difficult to have uniform
standards. One state may believe that an information field is private
and encode it, but other states may not. Since scanning equipment cannot think, the state a license is from does not matter, the scanner will
detect all fields it is capable of detecting. Some states also may decide
not to encode any of their data. These difficulties would leave some
state's citizens protected, and others not. Federal regulations would be
much more uniform, and efficient. A Federal regulation would force all
states to follow it. The self-regulation of encoding drivers' licenses so
scanners cannot read certain data, or leaving the burden on scanning
manufacturers to regulate themselves is not the best way to make scanning a beneficial yet safe practice.

D.

FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICE PRINCIPLES

Although the core fair information practice principles were developed for the online collection of data, the similarities between collecting
and using data from online consumers and scanning licenses to obtain
data are enough to implement the principles to the practice. The Internet allows for the low cost, efficient, and vast collection of information
from individuals. 2 75 The same is true with the advent of scanning of
drivers licenses. In the past if someone wanted to collect data off a drivers license, he would either have to write it down or make a photocopy of
it. Some argue that swiping is no different than making a copy of some274. Token Works, Products, http://www.cardvisor.com/default.htm (last accessed Nov.
12, 2004).
275. FTC Report, supra n. 6, at VI.
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one's license, 2 76 but it is far different. Copying a license is a process that
a person would be aware of, and the data would still be just on a piece of
paper unless it was entered into a database. Scanning, on the other
hand, makes the collection of the data much easier, it is already in electronic format, and very often people are misled about what the data will
7
be used for or that it will be used at all. 2 7 The same is true of Internet
data collection. People often enter private information about themselves
for online uses without knowing for exactly what purposes the information will be used. 2 78 The only difference is that with online information
gathering, the individual at least knows what information he or she is
releasing that could possibly be misused. With scanning, people often do
not even know their license contains encoded information, let alone that
the business who just asked for their license is taking it for their own
use. The process of scanning in most places is currently in violation of
the fair information practice principles. Without some type of a mechanism to enforce the core principles though, they are ineffective.
1.

Notice/Awareness

The first core principle of fair information practice is notice or
awareness. 27 9 Consumers should be given notice that information is being collected from them, otherwise they cannot make an informed deci280
As
sion as to what information they would like to disclose, if any.
well, if there is no notice given to the consumer then three of the other
principles, choice/consent, access/participation, and enforcement/redress
are not meaningful. 28 The scope and content of notice depends on the
substantive information practices of the entity collecting data, but the
following have been recognized as essential to assuring consumers are
aware they are divulging information:
* identification of the entity collecting the data;
* identification of the uses to which the data will be put;
* identification of any potential recipients of the data;
276. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supran. 1, at [1 17], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html.
277. Id. at [ 17-18].
278. FTC Report, supra n. 6, at VI (giving examples of how online merchants obtain
data without notifying the person supplying the information exactly how the data will be
used). Id. For example, an automobile dealership advertises on its website that it can help
consumers fix their credit rating. To take advantage of the offer consumers are asked to
provide their name, address, social security number, and telephone number on an online
information form. The website says nothing about how the information will actually be
used, or if the information will become available to third parties.
279. Id. at III(A)(1).
280. Id. at III(A)(1).
281. Id. at III(A)(1).
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" the nature of the data collected and the means by which it is col*

*

lected if not obvious;
whether the provision of the requested data is voluntary or required,
and the consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information; and
the steps taken by the data collector to ensure the confidentiality,
28 2
integrity and quality of the data.

Currently, most business entities who swipe or scan licenses are not
giving their customers any indication that the devices are actually storing data and not just checking the patron's age. 28 3 The consumer is not
told who will have access to the data, how it will be used, or the security
features involved to protect the data.28 4 Customers also have little control over what information they disclose in a transaction scan. Some
places do not allow people admittance or sales if they choose not to have
their card swiped, 28 5 while others will. 28 6 However, a business cannot
pick and choose what information fields to scan and retain for each individual customer. Submitting to a transaction scan will surrender all
data that device is programmed to record. 28 7 For these reasons, businesses are not satisfying the notice element of the core principles by alerting customers of the transaction scan process.
2.

Choice/Consent

The second core principal is choice or consent as to how the collected
data is used. 288 The customer must have some type of choice as to how
282. Id. at III(A)(1).
283. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1 18], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html ("The policy is that you shouldn't be collecting the info for one purpose
and using it for another. If you're telling them you're using it to verify their age, you
shouldn't be using it to market them"); Lee, supra n. 1 at [I1 2-3] (admitting that most
customers are not aware that scanning pulls up not just proof of age, but also name, address, birth date, and other personal information); Hong Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 (acknowledging that most patrons do not realize the amount of information stored on their
license that businesses may be collecting and storing in a database for marketing use).
284. Great Taste, Less Privacy,supra n. 1, at [1 18], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,
1294,62182,00.html; Lee, supra n. 1 at [T 2-3]; Chung, supra n. 1 at 443.
285. Swiping driver's licenses, supra n. 1 at [1 41 (citing that many private entities make
it very difficult for a customer to prohibit their license from being swiped and still gain
admittance or sales, and that many businesses condition sales on the ability of the entity to
swipe the card).
286. Great Taste, Less Privacy, supra n. 1, at [1 19-22], httpJ/www.wired.com/news/
print/0,1294,62182,00.html (Andy Rose, the manager of the West End restaurant in Little,
Rock Arkansas, scans and retains data from licenses. He has witnessed some customers
"raise hell" over having their license swiped. He subsequently states that if a patron objects, the bar does not insist on scanning the identification, and still allows admittance).
287. See generally Products, supra n. 274 (describing the information that the card
readers can detect).
288. FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III(A)(2).
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28 9
the information collected is used after the transaction is completed.
When an entity scans a license choice is not an issue because there is no
notice to the customer that the information is being collected. 290 Without notice, there can be no choice. 29 1 There must be both notice and consent for a consumer to be adequately protected under the Fair
Information Practice Principles.

3. Access /Participation
The third practice principle is access to the data stored or participation in its storage. 29 2 Individuals must have the ability to access the
personal records stored and to contest the information's accuracy and
completeness. 2 93 Once again, because here the customer does not have
notice that the information is being collected, access or participation is
2 94
inappropriately nullified.
4.

Integrity/Security

The fourth core principle is the integrity or security that the information stored is accurate and secure. Customers' data must be protected
by the source collecting it. 2 95 There must be no unauthorized disclosure
or use for unauthorized purposes of the data.2 96 The business must take
reasonable steps such as providing the customer access to the data, and
destroying untimely data. Although the entities collecting the data collect and utilize the records in different ways, it can be safely assumed
that not all establishments are taking the necessary steps to secure the
data. Since most scanners store the data in a basic format, such as
Microsoft Excel, that can be downloaded onto a computer, 29 7 the real
gatekeeper of the records becomes the business owner. Since there are
numerous types of entities using transaction scans to check identification and store the data, it is unknown what types of precautions these
business owners are taking. Possibilities include only the owner having
access to the computer that stores the data, limiting access to just the
management, or allowing all employees access. However businesses are
or are not limiting who has access to the data, it is very likely that not all
entities are adequately protecting the information.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at III(A)(2).
Id. at III(A)(1).
Id. at III(A)(1).
Id. at III(A)(3).
FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III(A)(3).
Id. at III(A)(1).
Id. at III(A)(4).
Id. at III(A)(4).
FAQ, supra n. 258.
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Enforcement/Redress

The fifth, and final, principle is enforcement or redress by the customer. 298 The FTC stated that "[iut is generally agreed that the core
principles of privacy protection can only be effective if there is a mechanism in place to enforce them."2 99 Absent some type of enforcement, the
fair information practice principles are no more than a suggestive guideline. 30 0 Currently there is no redress for someone whose information is
obtained and used unfavorably as a result of scanning.

E.

THE FUTURE

Swiping of drivers' licenses to gain entry into bars and restaurants,
as well as to purchase alcohol or tobacco, is already an established practice and becomes more widespread everyday. 30 1 However, here it appears that "technology has outpaced the law, and the casualty is
privacy." 30 2 Although some states have enacted legislation to prevent or
restrict the use of scanning and data retention, an overwhelming majority of states have no regulation of swiping whatsoever. On a national
level, the federal government has not even addressed the issue. This is
an issue that has too great of a public policy concern for the federal government to sit idly by while citizens privacy rights continue to be violated. One of the reasons the national government is in place is to
protect and provide for the general welfare of the citizens. 30 3 Allowing
private businesses to force consumers to trade their private personal information, which can be used to commit crimes or identity theft against
them, is not protecting citizens. There should be federal legislation enacted to regulate swiping.
There is a great deal of information already encoded on most state's
licenses, and with the advent of better technology, there will be even
more in the future. Digital fingerprints, digital signatures, and digital
photographs are just a few of the fields some state licenses now include.
This is information that a private business neither needs access to in
order to verify age, nor for any other reason would it be entitled to this
information. The only information a private entity needs to check proof
of age is the holder's date of birth, license expiration, license number,
and name. With this information the employee checking the card can
298. Id. at III(A)(5).
299. Id. at III(A)(5).
300. Id. at III(A)(5).
301. Chung, supra n. 1 at 443 (stating that in the United States an ever increasing
amount of businesses are using scanning technology to verify age of customers attempting
to purchase alcohol and tobacco).
302. Swiping driver's licenses, supra n. 1 at [91 1].
303. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the Power To... provide for
the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States. .. ).
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verify the license is valid, that the holder is over the age required, and
can compare the person to the picture on the license to verify he or she is
the holder of the license presenting it. The holder's address, social security number, height, weight, or other information is not needed to verify
age, and would not make the age validation process any more accurate.
The amount of information should be limited to protect consumer privacy. The few marketing benefits to the business of obtaining this information are highly outweighed by the serious risks of violent crime and
identity theft that the consumer is exposed to by surrendering such data.
The scanning equipment manufacturers should not be relied upon to restrict the amount of information to which their clients have access to,
because they should not have access to increased information either.
The same possibilities for harm and privacy concerns exist if the manufacturers have access to the information as if the businesses do.
A business should be allowed to store the name, date of birth, license
expiration and license number information in a database if it so desires,
but only for the assertion of an affirmative defense to the charge to transacting business with a minor. This limited storage would be similar to
the Ohio30 4 and Connecticut 30 5 statutes that allow the storage of a lim30 6
ited amount of data only for the assertion of an affirmative defense.
Also in accordance with both of these states' statutes, the business would
not be allowed to disseminate or sell the information to any third parties,
or to use the information for direct marketing purposes. 30 7 Finally, if
the private entity wishes to perform transaction scans and/or store the
data, then the business must comply with the fair information practice
principles in doing such. In other words, customers must be given: (1)
notice that the practice is taking place, (2) consent to the transaction, (3)
access to the stored data if requested to assure its accuracy, (4) security
of the data collected, and (5) enforcement if the process is not followed or
the data is misused. Even this limited amount of information is sensitive and must be protected to the utmost degree.
To protect the welfare of the public the penalties for breaking the
new law should be flexible, but strict. Fines, suspension or revocation of
the business license, and possible prison sentence is a good mixture of
regulation. Depending on the type of information collected, the way it
was used, and the length of time or amount of information collected the
punishment would vary. For instance, if addresses were being collected
for internal marketing use this may only be a fine the first time, and a
304. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61.
305. Conn. Gen. Stat, § 30-86; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344.
306. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(e); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(f); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2927.022; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.611.
307. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(d)(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-344(e)(3); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2927.021(D)(4); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.61(D)(4).
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possible suspension of business license the second time. If information
that is more private were collected, like social security numbers or digital signatures, then a first offense may result in a suspension of business
license, and a second infraction may end in incarceration.
Congress has the authority to enact such legislation from a Constitutional standpoint. The Commerce Clause 30 8 allows Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and in conjunction with the Necessary and
Proper Clause 30 9 Congress may enact legislation that it deems necessary
3 10
and proper to carry out what is defined in the Commerce Clause.
Since alcohol and tobacco are both items that move in interstate commerce and the actual purchasers of such goods may be from other states,
then Congress would be allowed to enact legislation regulating its
sale. 3 1 1 Congress also has the power to enact legislation affecting the
use of personal information included on drivers' licenses because it enacted the DPPA.3 12 Therefore, it would have the power to enact legislation regulating scanning of licenses or identification cards to verify proof
of age. This activity should not be left to the states in this situation because it is evident the states are not acting quickly enough to address the
issue, and because the lack of uniformity in the few existing state statutes would make any hope of future uniformity in state enacted scanning
regulations doubtful. Future federal legislation may look similar to this:
101-1. Sales of alcohol and tobacco to minors. Use of transaction scan
device as affirmative defense.
(a) Definitions:
(1) "Card holder" means any person who presents a driver's license,
commercial driver's license, or identification card in order to purchase
or receive alcohol products or tobacco products from a seller or agent or
employee of the seller; or any person who presents a driver's license,
commercial driver's license, or identification card to a permittee or
agent of employee of the permittee in order to gain admittance to a social establishment that sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes alco308. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("Power of Congress to regulate commerce. To regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.").
309. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 ("All necessary and proper laws. To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof).
310. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (describing how Congress has the
power to enact legislation not expressly set forth in the Constitution by combining the Necessary and Proper Clause with another enumerated power, such as the Commerce Clause).
311. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding that even though most of the
customers of Ollie's Barbecue were not traveling in interstate commerce, the business was
still involved in interstate commerce because a portion of its food had traveled in interstate
commerce, and some of its patrons had also traveled in interstate commerce).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
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3 13

holic beverages or tobacco products.
(2) "Identification card" means a state or federal issued
identification
3 14
card that has electronically encoded data stored on it.
(3) "Social establishment" means a business, club, or other entity that
under other regulations is required by law to check for proof of age
before selling, giving away, or otherwise distributing alcohol or tobacco
products to its customers. Social establishments include, but are not
31 5
limited to, bars, clubs, taverns, certain restaurants, cigar bars, etc.
(4) "Seller" means a seller of alcohol or tobacco products at a retail
out3 16
let, or the seller of alcohol or tobacco at a social establishment.
(5) "Permittee" means an owner or agent or employee of an owner who
owns a social establishment who checks for proof of age and allows admittance to a social establishment that requires the patron to be of a
certain age for entrance.
(6) "Transaction scan" means by which a seller/permittee or an agent or
employee of a seller/permittee checks, by means of a transaction scan
device, the validity of a driver's license, commercial driver's license, or
identification card that is presented as a condition to purchasing alcohol, tobacco, or gaining
entrance to a social establishment that sells al3 17
cohol or tobacco.
(7) "Transaction scan device" means any commercial device or combination of devices used at a point of sale, or a point of entrance to a social
establishment, that is capable of deciphering in an electronically readable format the information encoded on the magnetic strip, bar code,
computer chip, or some other type of electronic storage mechanism3of
a
18
driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identification card.
(8) "Fair information practice principles" means the five core principles
as defined in the Federal Trade Commission's 1998 report to Congress
and includes (1) notice/awareness, (2) choice/consent, (3) access/participation, (4) integrity/security, (5) enforcement/redress
regulating the col3 19
lection of personal information from the public.
(b)(1) A seller/permittee or an agent or employee of a seller/permittee
may perform a transaction scan by means of a transaction scan device
to check the validity of a driver's license, commercial driver's license, or
identification card presented by a card holder as a condition to selling,
giving away, or otherwise distributing alcohol, cigarettes, or other to3 20
bacco products.
(2) A seller/permittee or an agent or employee of a seller/permittee may
perform a transaction scan by means of a transaction scan device to
check the validity of a driver's license, commercial driver's license, or
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
See generally at § Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2927.021 (giving the original statute).
See generally Id. (giving the original statute).
See Id. (giving the original statute).
See Id. (giving the original statute).
See Id. (giving the original statute).
FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
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identification card presented by a cardholder as a condition to gaining
admittance to a social establishment.
(3) If the information deciphered by the transaction scan under subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection fails to match the information printed
on the driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identity card
presented by the cardholder, or if the transaction scan indicates that
the information so printed is false or fraudulent neither the seller/permittee nor any agent of the seller/permittee shall sell, give away, or otherwise distribute any alcohol or tobacco products or allow the card
321
holder to gain admittance to a social establishment.
(4) Division b(1)-(2) of this section does not preclude a seller/permittee
or an agent or employee of a seller/permittee from using a transaction
scan device to check the validity of a document other than a driver's
license, commercial driver's license, or identification card, if the document includes a bar code or magnetic strip that may be scanned by the
device, as a condition for selling, giving away, or otherwise distributing
alcohol, cigarettes, or other tobacco products to the person presenting
the document, or as a condition for admittance to a social establishment
32 2
to the person presenting the document.
(c)(1) No seller/permittee or agent or employee of a seller/permittee
shall electronically or mechanically record or maintain any information
32 3
derived from a transaction scan, except the following:
(A) The name and date of birth of the person listed on the driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identification card presented by
3 24
the card holder;
(B) The expiration date and identification number of the driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identification card presented by
32 5
the cardholder.
(2) No seller/permittee or agent or employee of a seller/permittee shall
use a transaction scan device for a purpose other than the purpose spec3 26
ified in divisions b(1)-(2) of this section.
(3) No seller/permittee or agent or employee of a seller/permitee shall
sell or otherwise disseminate the information derived from a transaction scan to any third party for any purpose, including, but not limited
to, any marketing, advertising, or promotional activities, except that a
seller/permittee or agent or employee of a seller/permittee may release
32 7
that information pursuant to a court order.
(4) Nothing in subsection (b) of this section or this subsection relieves a
seller or permittee or agent or employee of a seller or permittee of any
responsibility to comply with any other applicable state or federal laws
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.021.
Id. at § 2927.021.
Id. at § 2927.021.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86.
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or rules governing the sale, giving away, other distribution3 28of alcohol or
tobacco, or gaining admittance to a social establishment.
(d)(1) In any prosecution of a seller/permittee or agent or employee of a
seller/permittee for selling, giving away, or otherwise distributing alcohol or tobacco to a legally underage person, or allowing admittance to a
social establishment that sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes alcohol or tobacco to a legally underage person,
it shall be an affirmative
32 9
defense that all of the following occurred:
(A) A cardholder attempting to purchase alcohol, tobacco, or gain entry
to a social establishment that sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes
alcohol or tobacco presented a driver's license, commercial driver's li3 30
cense, or identification card;
(B) a transaction scan of the driver's license, commercial driver's license, or identification card that the
card holder presented indicated
33 1
that the license or card was valid;
(C) the alcohol or tobacco sold, given away, or otherwise distributed or
the admittance to the social establishment was approved in reasonable
reliance upon
the identification presented and the completed transac33 2
tion scan.
(2) In determining whether a seller/permittee or agent or employee of a
seller/permittee has proven the affirmative defense provided by subsection (1) of this subsection, the trier of fact in such prosecution shall consider that reasonable reliance upon the identification presented and the
completed transaction scan may require a seller/permittee or agent or
employee of a seller/permittee to exercise reasonable diligence and that
the use of a transaction scan device does not excuse a seller/permittee or
agent or employee of a seller/permittee
from exercising such reasonable
33 3
diligence to determine the following:
(A) Whether a person whom the seller/permittee or an agent or employee of the seller/permittee sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes
alcoholic liquor to is of legal age in the respective state to purchase such
alcoholic liquor33 4or is of legal age to gain admittance to a social
establishment.
(B) Whether a person whom the seller/permittee or an agent or employee of the seller/permittee sells, gives away, or otherwise distributes
tobacco is of legal age in the respective state to purchase such tobacco or
3 35
gain admittance to a social establishment.
(C) Whether the picture appearing on the driver's license
or identity
3 36
card presented by a cardholder is that of the cardholder.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at § 30-86.
Id. at § 30-86(e).
Id. at § 30-86(e)(1)(A).
Id. at § 30-86(e)(1)(B).
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(e)(1)(C).
Id. at § 30-86(e)(1)(C).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(B)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(e)(2)(A).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(B)(1); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(e)(2)(A).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2927.022(B)(2); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-86(e)(2)(B).
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(e)(1) Any transaction scan performed in conjunction with subsection (b)
(c) shall conform
and any data retention performed with subsection
33 7
with the fair information practice principles.
(f)(1) Any violation of the data collection and storage process outline in
subsection (c) or with the proper collection of data under subsection (e)
shall result in a punishment of a fine, and/or a suspension of the business's license, and/or incarceration. The punishment shall be in accordance with the number of offenses committed and the seriousness of the
offense. Empowers State Attorneys General to enforce this Act. 3 3 8 EsFederal injunctive authority regarding any violation of the
tablishes
3 39
Act.

A Statutory regulation similar to this will help protect the people's
privacy to the utmost degree. America's privacy must be highly protected so people do not fear that taking part in legal transactions could
jeopardize their security and safety. A society that fears taking part in
certain transactions that are legal could decrease the United States'
economy because people may refrain from purchasing items or visiting
certain establishments in order to protect their privacy. A person should
be able to buy a bottle of wine or go to a club to hear their favorite band
without having to exchange their life history for it. The scanning technology is spreading rapidly; the states are haphazardly regulating it, so
the federal government should step forward with legislation to curtail
scanning before the practice becomes completely uncontrollable.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Scanning or swiping of drivers licenses and identification cards to
verify age is a practice that has emerged recently because of the development of better technology, and it is ever increasing. 340 Few states have
enacted legislation to regulate it, and the federal government has not
addressed the issue. Meanwhile, many patrons' private and sensitive information is being stolen by businesses without the customers' knowledge. Federal legislation should be enacted to nationally regulate the
practice before a customer becomes the victim of a violent crime, or of an
identity theft, which is committed using the patron's stolen personal information. The information included on drivers licenses and identification cards currently is too sensitive for private industry to possess.
Additionally there is no valid reason for them to have it. Unaccountable
private individuals cannot be entrusted with the duty to protect the security and privacy of hundreds or thousands of people. The federal government has already addressed similar concerns in private industries, in
337.
338.
339.
340.

FTC Report, supra n. 6, at III.

Sen. 116, 109th Cong.
Id.
Chung, supra n. 1 at 443.
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the health care industry with the implementation of HIPAA3 4 1 and with
DMVs under the DPPA,3 4 2 and needs to address theses concerns currently with swiping. The owner of a club in New Orleans, who scans
identification cards and stores the data, summed up the situation best:
"Will I use it [the information scanned from the license] in the wrong
way? No. But then again, what is to stop the next guy?" 3 4 3 The only
way to stop the "next guy" is to regulate scanning and subsequent data
retention.
John T. Crosst
341. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41 (2004).
342. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
343. Lee, supra n. 1 [ 38-39].
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